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Beyond the borders of the Globelics village 
 
This paper addresses the issue of global governance. At first sight this is a topic which 
appears to fall beyond the “village borders” of the Globelics initiative. The analytical 
focus for the Globelics network proposed last year (Lundvall and Soete, 2002) was upon 
national innovation and competence building systems, paying in particular attention to 
international comparative analyses with respect to the “south”. The geographical 
emphasis on low(er) income countries appeared justified by the impression of an 
increasing tendency towards research diversion in this area in favor of international, high 
income countries’, comparative analyses, providing policy advice and support to various 
countries’ attempts at becoming the most competitive or knowledge intensive regions in 
the world. At the same time, the definition of innovation system was kept broad: “rooted 
in the production and human resource development system” to quote Lundvall (2002) 
rather than just limited to the R&D system. There were several reasons which justified 
such an approach. Thus as Lundvall noted: “Several OECD-countries that are 
characterised by a low-tech specialisation in production and exports are among the 
countries in the world with the highest GNP per capita. To focus on the rather small part 
of the economy engaged in formal R&D-activities would give very limited insights 
regarding the growth potential for these countries and the same would be true for low 
income countries. A second reason has to do with the fact that empirical studies only 
partially support the original hypothesis in Lundvall (1985) about innovations systems as 
primarily constituted by inter-firm, user-producer relationships. It is an obvious 
alternative to broaden the perspective on regional and national systems  and to see them 
as constituted also by a common knowledge base embedded in local institutions and 
embodied in people living and working in the region. The final and perhaps the most 
important reason for taking the broader view has to do with the developments toward a 
‘learning economy’. This hypothesis points to the need to give stronger emphasis to the 
analysis of the development of human and organisational capabilities. In the national 
education systems people learn specific ways to learn. In labour markets they experience 
nation specific incentive systems and norms will have an impact on how and what they 
learn.” (Lundvall, 2002). 
 
But such insights will of course also have to fit the rather radically changing external, 
international environment. As we already indicated last year, we side on this issue with 
Ulrich Beck: “a fundamental change is occurring in the nature of the social and political – 
an erosion of anthropological certitudes which compels the social sciences to modify 
their theoretical tools… the crucial question is how, beyond the mere assertion of an 
epochal break, sociology can strengthen its theoretical, methodological and 
organizational foundations by making them more concrete or focused and in this was 
ultimately renew its claim to another enlightenment. The keyword in this international 
controversy is globalisation. The consequences of this for society (and sociology) have 
been spelt out most clearly in the English-speaking countries… where it has been 
forcefully argued that conventional social and political science remains caught up in a 
national-territorial concept of society. Critics of ‘methodological nationalism’ have 
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attacked its explicit or implicit premise that the national state is the ‘container’ of social 
processes and that the national framework is still the one best suited to measure and 
analyse major social, economic and political changes. The social sciences are thus found 
guilty of ‘embedded statism’ and thought is given to a reorganization of the 
interdisciplinary field…”(Beck, 2002) 
The focus on “national” systems of innovations is from this perspective invaluable in 
bringing to the forefront the importance of such “state” institutions in inducing or 
hindering processes of national competence building in a variety of different countries. 
The attempts at comparative learning through such detailed studies have actually formed 
the basis for the hype of innovation policy benchmarking exercises carried out within the 
EU and across the EU, the US and Japan. Following Beck though, there is in our view, 
here too a need to broaden this framework in line with the rapid rise in globalisation 
pressures and the existing lack of global governance. It is to the latter issue that this paper 
hopes to make a small contribution. After all, our network is named Globelics. 
 
The “global” in Globelics 
 
Although most observers agree on the presence of a process of globalization, the exact 
nature of this process is heavily contested. There is a truly intense debate on the causes, 
the extent, the shape, the dynamics and the consequences of globalization; expressed in a 
large amount of studies, articles, books, reports and conferences. The debate covers the 
broad area of the economic, political, social and cultural domains, and involves 
participants from many different backgrounds. The broadness of the debate indicates that 
the process of globalization does represent a social change at a quite fundamental level, 
impacting a wide range of spheres in society; the intensity of the debate indicates that this 
change is complex and far from smooth.  
 
Whenever we speak of ‘change’ in the context of globalization, it helps to specify in 
which of the two major meanings one employs the concept. On one extreme, social 
change is conceived as a set of blind and impersonal forces: structural trends to which 
human agents are exposed as passive objects, to whom change ‘happens’. Change of this 
sort might consist of trends in climate such as global warming or the emergence of some 
new technologies, which have often not been consciously initiated and which to the 
individual or individual firm seem impossible to be controlled let alone be stopped. On 
the other extreme, change is seen as a process that results from deliberate and intentional 
efforts of human agents, in order to cope, individually or collectively, with needs and 
problems that they encounter in social, economic and political life. In this latter version 
of change human agents are active subjects, they are ‘making’ history. 
 
A synthesis of these two modes of understanding and experiencing change can be found 
in the work of authors like Hegel and Marx. The forces of change human agents find 
themselves confronted with, are in fact largely the result of their own actions, even if they 
are no longer recognizable as such. They are the unintended results and unanticipated 
side-effects of aggregate human behavior; the sum of countless conscious, deliberate 
human decisions and actions. Many of these human actions in fact are reactions; 
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reactions to phenomena like globalization, that though man-made, appear no longer man-
controlled. There is hence, not surprisingly, also a view – most clearly made explicit in 
some of the new Marxist contributions – to view globalization as an external, beyond 
human control movement. Somewhat like the Monster of Frankenstein, the man-made 
phenomenon of globalization escapes human control and becomes an autonomous force 
in society1. 
  
In more than one way, there is no exit from globalization. Autarchy as an economic 
sustainable system has today more or less disappeared from the earth. No country could 
afford these days exit from the international trading system. Autarchy and the closing of 
frontiers is today rather imposed on countries as a sanction (North Korea, Iraq) with 
devastating effects on the country’s economy and in particular it’s citizens’ welfare, 
public health, schooling and other basic necessities. There is also no exit for those asylum 
seekers whose application for refugee status is rejected and which are finally being sent 
home fearing the worse for their security. The claim that there is no exit from 
globalization holds also for global governance. There is, as long as we haven’t discovered 
any signs of outer space life, no other “external” environment, with whom to quarrel, 
negotiate, build alliances or achieve win-win situations.  
 
Global governance differs in other words from traditional forms of governance where one 
is to some extent always dealing with insiders and outsiders, with ‘us’ and ‘them’. The 
function of traditional governance structures (be it governments, firms, gangs) is 
relatively straightforward: to enhance the well being of the insiders, while in several ways 
taking into account the outsiders: as allies or enemies, as partners or competitors, as 
relevant or irrelevant. This is actually most clear in those cases of formal government 
structures that because of the distinct nature of their authority always need some explicit 
justification. Thus, ancient city-states, medieval feudal kingdoms, and modern nation 
states generally came into being as a result of internal association (shared language, 
culture, history) on the one side, and external pressures (wars, foreign oppression, natural 
threats) on the other. They derived an important part of their legitimacy – and thereby 
authority and effectiveness – from the fact that they were representing and protecting the 
interests of their subjects or citizens against an outside world. With global governance, 
this element is missing; the world by definition has no ‘outside world’. There is no exit. 
There is no external disciplining force: global governance is a pure exercise in collective 
self-control. 
 
The present paper focuses on the problems this raises for global governance. The fact that 
there is no exit, calls in the celebrated vision of Albert Hirschman, for a clear and loud 
voice. Hirschman’s “exit, voice and loyalty” (Hirschman, 1970) framework appears 
remarkably suitable to analyze the current problems of global governance. Exit from a 
job, a family, a city, a country is always possible, even if at times it may be very costly. 
Exit from global governance, as argued above, is impossible: at best it might express 
itself in neglect, cynicism, national cocooning. Voice by contrast provides an outlet: an 
                                                 
1 The ‘monster-view’ can for example be found in neo-marxist literature like Negri and Hardt’s Empire 
(2001), or in Castell’s Network Society in which a global network-logic is ‘grazing’ the world for 
profitable pastures, including and excluding areas as it sees fit.  
 4
outlet for the concerned global citizen (or Globelics researcher!) frustrated by the lack of 
global governance in areas of particular concern to him or her. There is little doubt that 
the current structure of global governance is, with few exceptions such as the rules 
governing international trade (WTO) or international currency exchanges and lending of 
last resort (IMF), relatively weak. Certainly when compared to the spread of global 
pressures moving well beyond the international exchange of goods and finance. And so 
“voice” has really been organized and found expression in the activities of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) which have grown rapidly over the last decades 
and spread across the various and innumerable subjects which citizens appear concerned 
about: from the torture of humans and animals, the preservation of species and the rain 
forest, the quality of food to environmental degradation and the use of child labor.  
 
 
Globelics as “voice” 
  
Much of the debate on globalization and global governance often does not so much 
reflect real, true, principal disagreement, but rather misunderstanding and 
miscommunication between participants. Not surprisingly, there is no clear shared frame 
of reference in the discussion – the discussion itself partly is about competing frames of 
reference. Still, this makes it rather difficult to position the different kinds of discussion 
relative to each other, and distil the real points of disagreement out of it to put them at the 
forefront – to make clearer what the actual choices at stake are, instead of getting lost in 
an analytical labyrinth with many ways but no way out. In  a first section we hope to add 
value to the discussion by presenting a number of theoretical notions from the literature 
that are ‘transdisciplinary’: they combine the insights from several disciplines in social 
sciences and thereby have the potential for structuring the plurality of issues, 
developments, opinions and discussions concerning globalization and global governance. 
 
Globalization leads to global problems and poses global policy challenges, and dealing 
with these requires some form of global governance. ‘Governance’ as we argue in the 
second section is not the same as ‘government’; governance refers to the whole structure 
of institutions regulating human behavior, including we suggest the triad of “the state”, 
“the market” and “the community”. But while global governance will to some extent 
resemble such traditional structures of governance, it has several important unique 
features. Apart from the “no exit” possibilities, the geographical and organizational scale 
and size, and the variety and diversity global governance is confronted with, is most 
unique. This has profound implications, both practical and theoretical. At a global level, 
many theoretical notions about governance, government and management that were 
developed in an open inside/outside context (firm, state, club) look quite differently 
within the context of a “no exit” framework, some even loose part of their 
meaningfulness. Nevertheless, much can be learned from existing systems of governance, 
even though in the end global governance will be different. However, the world cannot 
afford too much ‘trial and error’.  
 
That is exactly the reason why “voice” in the form of active debate, discussion and 
proposals for alternative governance is of such an importance as we argue in section 3 of 
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this paper. It can assist in identifying some of the best conditions for the global 
experiment. Hence, the importance of the particular role of NGOs. We consider the exit, 
voice and loyalty framework particularly useful to analyze the particular contribution of 
NGO’s to the global governance debate. Voice, even if it might be at some times too 
noisy, too cumbersome or too biased, has, we would argue, to be cherished. It is the only 
outlet for improvements in global governance, which NGO’s have activated. NGO’s 
provide, by no means exclusively, to some extent the voice of the ‘voiceless’: the losers 
from international competition, but also those that cannot raise their voice: future 
generations, (ethnic) minority groups, the victims of global diseases; as well as the whale, 
the giant panda or the rain forest that have no voice. If it weren’t for NGO’s, 
globalization would resemble increasingly a process of change outside of the control of 
humans with no exit, and only the voice of cynicism and distrust left. So let Globelics 
become the global voice of innovation researchers without frontiers. 
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When looking at the discourse on globalization of the last decade2, commentators seem to 
have disagreed on almost every point: whether there really is a process of globalization 
taking place; and if so, since when, to what extent and in which domains; and in which 
ways and with what consequences; and whether it can be considered to be a really 
fundamentally new phenomenon or just more of the same.3 Globalization is not only 
politically hotly debated, it is also one of the most contested topics in the social sciences 
these days. By now there is an appalling amount of literature on the topic of globalization 
and global governance. Whereas less then a decade ago the literature on globalization 
was mostly positive of tone, the past few years this tone has changed quite drastically: the 
pendulum has swung back and the focus now mainly seems to be on the problematic side 
of globalization4. 
 
                                                 
2 Like Guillen (2001) and many other authors do. 
3 Some observers state that globalization is a historically unique, new phenomenon, since due to new 
information and communication technologies the world has turned in at a global village; others claim that 
globalization was always there and that the world in the times of Alexander the Great or in the 19th century 
was more global than today; while again others are even stating that a process of globalization does not 
really exist except in the discourse, that it is a typical example of social construction. 
4 To list just a few titles of books published over the last few years bringing to the forefront the impression 
of pluriformity of the debate:  
There is Uhlrich Beck with What is Globalization? (2000), Anthony Giddens’ Runaway World: How 
Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives (2000), Joseph Stiglitz with Globalization and Its Discontents (2002), 
and Cavanagh et al. writing on Alternatives to Economic Globalization (2002) and The Challenge of 
Global Capitalism (2002) by Robert Gilpin and even already The End of Globalization (James 2000) and 
Global Anarchy (2000) by Smith, Lyons, and Moore. Globalization has many aspects, as is reflected in 
book titles like Global Woman (2002) by Ehrenreich and Hochschild; Global Sport (1999) by Maguire; 
Faith and Interfaith in a Global Age (1998) by Marcus Braybrooke; Citizenship in a Global Age (2001) by 
Delanty; Nation and Citizenship in the Global Age: From National to Transnational Ties and Identities 
(2001) from Munch; Global Mind Change (1998) by Harman; Nations Without States: Political 
Communities in a Global Age (1999) by Montserrat Guibernau; Global Culture/Individual Identity: 
Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket (2000) by Gordon Mathews; and even The Global Soul: 
Jet Lag, Shopping Malls, and the Search for Home (2001), by Pico Iyer. On the subject of ‘global 
governance’ more specifically, also many books, articles and policy-reports have been written: Paul 
Kennedy et al. with Global Trends and Global Governance (2002); Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey Hart et al. 
with Globalization and Governance (2000); Oran Young et al. with Global Governance: Drawing Insights 
from the Environmental Experience (1997); Brian Loader et al. with The Governance of Cyberspace: 
Politics, Technology and Global Restructuring (1997). Aksu and Camilleri et al. with Democratizing 
Global Governance (2002); David Held of course with Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern 
State to Cosmopolitan Governance (1996), Richard Falk’s Religion and Humane Global Governance 
(2001); Mark Duffield’s Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and 
Security (2001). Furthermore, on the subject of global ‘civil society’, there are again are many publications. 
To again name just a few of the most recent books: Michael Walzer’s Toward Global Civil Society (1998); 
Tadashi et al. with Governance in a Global Age: The Impact of Civil Society from a comparative 
Perspective (2001); John Keane’s Global Civil Society? (forthcoming 2003); the Global Civil Society 
Yearbook (2001, 2002), published by two research centers of the London School of Economics; Mary 
Kalder’s Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (2003). 
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Whereas Uhlrich Beck in What is Globalization? (2000) is still trying to answer the 
question on what globalization actually is, Harold James is already announcing in The 
End of Globalization (James 2000) the possible end of globalization. Beck aims to clarify 
the many ambiguities in the debate on globalization, by distinguishing different types of 
globalization in different domains, and identifying some conceptual traps. He addresses 
issues like ‘transnational social spaces’, ‘methodological nationalism’, ‘national 
branding’, ‘place polygamy’, ‘globalization of compassion’, ‘experimental cultures’ and 
‘public entrepreneurs’. He discusses possible political responses to globalization, for 
example the prospect of a ‘transnational state’, and warns for the alternative prospect of 
‘Brazilianization’.5 In this view, globalization leads to a reality with on the one side a 
small, cosmopolitan core elite of people with money, and – more important – with 
knowledge and skills, that have all the key positions in society, and on the other side a 
wide peripheral with mass of people going from one low-value flexible temporary job to 
the other before ending in unemployment, competing with each other for the diminishing 
amount of remaining work, at the mercy of the whims of the global economy, living a 
‘patchwork life’ at the broad margin. James points to another possible ‘doom scenario’: a 
fissioning not along class-lines, but along nation-lines, which in due time will basically 
end globalization. He shows how the growing world trade of the 1920s and 1930s led to 
imbalance, uncertainty, protectionist actions and responses, which was a major factor 
giving rise to the worldwide Depression of the 1930s. By analyzing current policies of 
major countries, James argues that globalization (again) breeds its own nationalist 
responses that, if not counteracted, can lead away from free markets and even 
dangerously toward political dictatorship, as happened in Germany in the 1930s. 
 
Anthony Giddens, in Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives (2000) 
sees globalization as a major development transforming almost every aspect of people’s 
lives everywhere. Giddens sees a divide not along class-lines or nation-lines, but along 
the lines of attitude and mentality. According to Giddens, the battleground of the twenty-
first century will pit fundamentalism against cosmopolitan tolerance. In a globalizing 
world, where information and images are routinely transmitted across the globe, everyone 
is regularly in contact with others who think differently, and live differently. 
Cosmopolitans welcome and embrace this cultural complexity; fundamentalists find it 
disturbing and dangerous and take refuge in a renewed and purified (religious, ethnic, 
national) traditions – and, quite often, violence.  
 
Joseph Stiglitz, in Globalization and Its Discontents (2002), focuses on the creation and 
subsequent misgovernment of globalization by “faceless international bureaucrats”. As 
chief economist at the World Bank, Stiglitz was confronted with policymakers using 
                                                 
5 This is a term coined, or at least made popular, by Michael Lind in his book The Next American Nation 
(1996). According to Lind, the real threat to the United States is the decline of the influence of principles of 
liberal democracy. This will not come about, as many multiculturalists claim, as a result of a Balkanization 
or fragmentation along racial or ethnic lines. Rather, the decline will come about, Lind believes, due to a 
Brazilianization which he defines as a “fissioning along class lines”. “Brazilianization is symbolized by the 
increasing withdrawal of the white American overclass into its ... world of private neighborhoods, private 
schools, private police, private health care, and even private roads, walled off from the spreading squalor 
beyond. Like a Latin American oligarchy, the rich and well connected members of the overclass can 
flourish in a decadent America with Third World levels of inequality and crime.” (Lind 1996). 
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outdated economic models and dogmatic design policies, based on mistaken political 
doctrines like the ‘Washington Consensus’, that were maintained even when it became 
clear that they did not hold and were detrimental to the countries and situations to which 
they were applied. Stiglitz observed within the major institutions of globalization a 
damaging desire for secrecy, thereby excacerbating mistakes, covering up power-
structures and hidden agendas, and inhibiting positive change and learning. International 
institutions are not in touch with the immense diversity of institutional, economic, social 
and cultural settings in this world, and – worse – they do not even seem to mind this. 
 
Cavanagh et al., in Alternatives to Economic Globalization (2002) are presenting both a 
critique of globalization as well as possibly realistic alternatives. They assert ten core 
requirements for sustainable societies, including equality, basic human rights, local 
decision making, and ecological sustainability, and demonstrate how globalization 
undermines each of these. To deal with the scarcity of feasible alternative visions they 
then discuss alternative systems for energy, agriculture, transportation, and 
manufacturing, and ideas for weakening, dismantling and replacing the WTO, World 
Bank, and IMF, institutions that in their view are too much tied to the present power 
structure and though may have the best intentions, are simply not able to bring the far-
reaching changes that are required for sustainable development. 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction of this paper, globalization is far from a uniform, 
inevitable trend: it is a fragmented, incomplete, discontinuous, contingent, and in many 
ways contradictory process. Not surprisingly, there is no uniform agreed upon definition 
of globalization. Most define it – in different variations – as basically a process of 
increasing global interdependence (of actors, processes, economies, nations). Others 
point out that globalization is not only a process in social reality, but also an ideological 
construct, that is used to justify a wide range of more concrete political standpoints. 
Depending on the story about globalization (good-bad, new-old, inevitable-avoidable, 
etc.) it is used to halt certain developments, and to stimulate others. 
 
There are numerous indicators for globalization: international trade, mobility, 
telecommunication, number of multinationals and international organizations, spread of 
the English language. It is interesting to observe that the fastest increase among the 
indicators does not refer to globalization itself, but to the literature on globalization. 
There has been an explosion in the number of articles and books on globalization 
published in the economic, sociological, and political literatures. Perhaps the most 
bewildering feature of the literature is not its size but the remarkable diversity of authors 
that have contributed to it, ranging from postmodernist scholars or social theorists who 
rarely, if ever, engage in empirical research to number-crunching empiricists, politicians, 
and management consultants.  
 
The debate on globalization and global governance is both positive (what is happening, 
what could happen) and normative (what should happen – from the perspective of certain 
ideals, values, passions, interests, hopes, fears). The positive and the normative elements 
in the debate are not always easy to distinguish and hard to fully separate. Many (factual) 
discussions on globalization-the-phenomenon are in fact also (normative) discussions 
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(neo-liberal, neo-marxist, fundamentalist, etc.), even if this is not recognized or 
acknowledged as such.  
 
The different normative positions in the debate are, not surprisingly, related to the 
different backgrounds, cultures, (disciplinary) viewpoints, values, interests and 
experiences of the participants – these are to a large extent determining the perception, 
selection and interpretation of facts, and the type and direction of the analysis of these 
facts. The differences are multiple and large, and the consequence is that debate on 
globalization does not only reflect these difference, but also simple misunderstandings 
related to these differences: resulting from the different assumptions, concepts and 
language used, which are not made explicit because for the users they are self-evident. 
This hinders progress in the debate, that tends to retreat into different circles of relatively 
like-minded participants that are not very open to each other. The different role 
participants in the debate have also accounts for some of the disagreement or rather, the 
lack of finding common ground. The idealistic demonstrating activists with their calls for 
sustainable development and human rights for all, the cautious social scientists with their 
detailed, specialist analyses concerning certain sub-areas, and the pragmatic 
policymakers that have to be realistic, simplifying, negotiating, compromising – between 
these kinds of different roles (and accompanying personalities), there is not much mutual 
understanding and appreciation. A large share of the disagreement in the debate on 
globalization results from misunderstanding rather than disagreeing.  
 
As to the research on globalization, there are roughly three layers of analysis that are 
more or less interwoven, but still can be distinguished. First, there are the actual 
developments that make up globalization, like the expansion of world trade, the growth in 
international capital flows or the dramatic increase in information and communication 
streams across the globe with the advent of Internet. Second, there is the layer of the 
debate on globalization. With the rapid growth of globalization literature, this level of 
analysis has grown in importance and can be found almost standard in the introductory 
paragraph or first chapter of any publication on globalization. The focus at this level is on 
the different ways of interpreting and valuing the concrete developments observed and 
described at the first level of analysis. Third, there is the layer of what could be called 
‘the debate on the debate’. At this level, there is the recognition that globalization is too 
complex to be understood from any one single perspective or analytical framework, but 
needs an open, so to say “global” approach – in the sense of multi-disciplinary, multi-
culturally, multi-ideologically. Moreover, there is the notion that the different approaches 
that are used to analyze globalization contain information in themselves. Instead of 
regretting the presence of so many approaches and trying to reduce them to a single 
approach, the plurality of approaches is seen as the core of the matter. By analyzing the 
standpoints in the debate, determining where it comes from and what it can tell you, 
important insight is gained about the process of globalization – because in the end, it is 
also the globalization of ideas that is at stake and that needs to be studied and discussed, 
as part of the overall work on globalization. This level of analysis is concerned with the 
different types of explanations given (e.g. neo-liberal, neo-marxist, conservative, 
fundamentalist) and how they interact in a global arena of ideas. 
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In the literature, often all three levels of analysis are addressed to some extent, though 
seldom is this explicitly recognized and accounted for. 
 
It is important to recognize these types of generic analytical problems in the literature on 
globalization (the dual notion of change, the mixture of positive and normative aspects, 
the interweaving of different layers of analysis), in order to get more grip on what is 
actually communicated in an article, report or book. Following, the major issues in the 
globalization debate are briefly presented. 
 
 
1.1. The Global Economy 
 
Economically, the last half-century has seen unparalleled growth and transformation, and 
globalization is seen as an important causal factor in this. During the 19th century, the 
world economy gradually became more integrated through international trade and capital 
movements. The latest World Economic Outlook (IMF 2003) gives a detailed description 
of this process. From the mid-19th century until 1914, world trade expanded more rapidly 
than real output: 3.5% against 2.7%. This was partly a consequence of a reduction in 
effective import duties, which on average came down from 15% to 5%, and of greatly 
reduced transport costs. The First World War and the subsequent depression of the 1930s 
meant a serious setback in the integration process. It was only after the Second World 
War that the creation of the GATT and accompanying reforms set the integration process 
moving again. The ratio of international trade (exports and imports) over GDP of many 
countries overtook that of 1913 only around the late 70s/early 80s, but after catching up, 
it continued to grow steadily. 
 
Today, foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP is 2.5 times greater than twenty 
years ago – and nearly four times greater in the developing world. Trade has also grown, 
although not as fast as foreign investment. Financial globalization has grown fastest: 
Foreign exchange turnover increased tenfold between 1979 and 1997 relative to world 
GDP, and both cross-border bank credit and assets have increased more than twofold as a 
percentage of world GDP (CGG 1997). In the 90s, one day of foreign exchange trade was 
typically more than hundred times higher than world yearly trade (Eatwell 1996). The 
barriers to capital movement have rapidly come down, resulting in a growth of the 
volatility of the (financial) economy. It is mainly the short-term, speculative finance that 
has grown, having only limited impact upon long-term foreign investment activities in 
the ‘real’ economy. Savings and investments have remained stubbornly national. 
 
Multinational companies have somewhat increased production activities outside the home 
country. However, this ‘multinationalization’ of production has mainly been an intra-
OECD phenomenon, and country-specific patterns of specialization often continue to be 
persistent (Meliciani 2001). Labor markets have not really globalized, with the exception 
of the growing mobile top tail of the skills distribution (engineers, scientists, managers, 
actors, football players, etc.) and the growing mobile end-tail of illegal aliens, fugitives, 
migrants. Persistently national labor markets show equally persistent high asymmetries in 
skills of the population (Dosi 2002).  
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There is a continuing concentration of innovative activities, which are matched by 
persistent international differences in the share of resources devoted to formal 
technological learning, which will not be elaborated upon here as it as the core of most of 
the other contributions to this first Globelics conference.  
 
Let us just briefly highlight though the importance of information and communication 
technology (ICT) as driving force for globalization, dramatically lowering barriers of 
time and money for the transport of information, goods and people. It has become 
extraordinarily more efficient for some firms to locate different phase of the production 
process in different parts of the world. To illustrate: the cost of a three minute telephone 
call New York-London has come down from $ 188.50 in 1970 to $ 3.50 now (Witteveen 
1998), and the prices of computer have come down even much more sharply. 
In addition to such ICT, the non-economic integration of parts of the world (in terms of 
institution, political structures, mentality) has facilitated the economic globalization (and 
vice versa). 6 
 
Widespread trade liberalization and financial deregulation have now created an 
increasingly global market. Many countries have benefited by seizing the opportunities of 
globalization, but others have gained little. Institutional and tariff impediments to 
globalization have remained the highest in activities in which developing countries are 
often more competitive, such as agricultural products, textile, etc. Striking international 
price differentials exist even in tradable commodities with low trade barriers production 
and consumption (Bradford 2002). Weaker countries risk being (further) marginalized.  
 
Globalization seems to be biased in favor of countries with a more developed economic 
system that disproportionally profit from the opportunities that came with globalization. 
Not surprisingly, countries are (wanting or not) ‘importing’ elements of the specific 
institutional set-up of the liberal Anglo-Saxon system, because it could enable them to 
maybe also profit from globalization. However, systems cannot simply be transplanted. 
Though on average real GDP per head in developing countries has doubled in the last 
thirty years (Witteveen 1998), inequality has risen within many countries, rich and poor, 
and the gap between the richest and the poorest has widened sharply, with an increasing 
concentration of income, resources and wealth among certain people, corporations and 
countries. In more than 80 countries, income per head is less than a decade or more ago, 
and in 55 countries income per head has been falling since 1990. Before the Industrial 
Revolution the income gap between the poorest and the richest countries was smaller 
than 1 to 2, probably 1 to 1.5 (Bairoch 1981, Dosi et al. 1990). Since then, the dominant 
tendency is of fast increasing differentiation among countries, and overall divergence. 
Though economic progress has benefited many, the global distribution of it remains very 
uneven; a sixth of the world’s people presently live in absolute poverty, and even the 
richest countries are troubled by a deprived underclass.  
 
As the actual capacity to use knowledge becomes a key to economic success, world 
disparities could well deepen. Furthermore, the growing disparities are made more visible 
                                                 
6 For an overview of the extent to which such globalization can be considered a “new” phenomenon, see for 
example Petit and Soete (2001). 
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by the media’s wider reach, which accentuates discontent and, among other things, 
produces pressure for migration, not just from rural to urban areas in developing 
countries, but also from poorer to richer countries. But while frontiers are broken open by 
economic forces, they are being closed against people. This limiting of migration by 
narrowing of access is a growing source for tension and conflict. The most energetic of 
the denied migrants may decide to devote their skills and entrepreneurship to the illegal 
economy. More in general, people that have little to loose and no (legal) ways to gain, 
easily become a destabilizing factor in society.  
 
The pace of the globalization of financial and other markets seems to be outstripping the 
capacity of governments to provide the necessary framework of rules and co-operative 
arrangements to ensure stability and prevent abuses of monopoly and other market 
failures. National solutions to problems originating from a globalized economy are 
severely limited, while the limited structures of global governance are still 
underdeveloped and often tied to national interests7.  
 
 
1.2. Global Security 
 
The world might have been spared of “world wars” in recent decades, conflict and 
violence have not diminished. In particular, there has been a rise in strife not between but 
within states. Global integration seems to be counterbalanced by an equally strong trend 
of fragmentation. More ethnic groups than ever seem to be reasserting their identities and 
yearning to create their own state. These have resulted in large-scale suffering, gross 
abuses of human rights and massive refugee problems, sometimes requiring external 
intervention. Many of these internal conflicts have highlighted the actual vulnerability of 
minorities in general. The focus of new security concerns is not the threat of traditional 
interstate wars but the fear of underdevelopment as a source for conflict, criminalized 
activity and international instability.  
 
Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 
11th, it has become clear that seemingly internal, isolated, geographically contained 
conflicts (like in the Middle East) can become “globalized”, in a dramatic way. Small 
terrorist groups have discovered the vulnerability of the global political and economic 
system, and of the states build on these, however strong their army is. Global terrorism 
has given war a new dimension. It is very hard to fight a global, international war against 
a closed, professional, dedicated underground network with no clear location, which can 
use all the global information and communication networks – especially when using 
conventional methods (police, army). However, using unconventional methods may pose 
problems in the area of human rights. Different parties seem to have learned different 
                                                 
7 Global economic governance is provided by the Bretton Woods Institutes and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The Bretton Woods Institutions are the World Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). They were set up at a meeting of 43 countries in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA in 
July 1944. Their aims were to help rebuild the shattered postwar economy and to promote international 
economic cooperation. The original Bretton Woods agreement also included plans for an International 
Trade Organization (ITO) but these lay dormant until the World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in 
the early 1990s.  
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lessons from the international terrorist attacks. Many are of the opinion that if anything, 
September 11 more than ever shows the need for global governance based on 
international law, international justice and compliance as well as voluntary cooperation, 
mutual respects and understanding. Isolated conflicts, such as the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, can no longer be treated in isolation; the emotions, the uncertainty, the moral 
conflict, the war methods, will in the current international mobile world spill-over to 
other countries, unless there is a global institutional system to keep things in check. 
Others however interpret September 11 as a signal that the different parts of the world are 
too different and their interests too diverging and contradicting to ever agree. This in their 
view should be recognized, not denied, and action should be directed to protecting the 
own interests, since others are doing the same. Again others choose to mystify the issue, 
by demonizing international relationships, speaking either of an ‘axis of evil’ (US 
administration) or of a ‘Holy War’ that has to be fought (Islamic leaders). Though a 
‘clash of cultures’ – a conflict of different, mutually exclusive norms, values, and beliefs 
– definitely seems to be part of the story (Huntington 1996), it is important not to reduce 
it to this. 
 
Rivalry has always been inherent among sovereign states. In the past, states’ efforts to 
increase their own security by expanding their military capabilities and forming alliances 
with other military powers invariably threatened the security of other states. The struggle 
for national security was a perpetual zero-sum game in which some states won and others 
lost. In this 21st century, war between states seems even less likely than before to produce 
any real winners. The world has become too small and too crowded, its people too 
intermingled and too interdependent, its weapons too lethal. Ballistic missiles, long-range 
aircraft, and weapons of mass destruction have made the security offered by national 
boundaries even more illusory. Efforts by great powers to preserve their military 
dominance will stimulate emerging powers to acquire more military strength. At the same 
time, emerging powers’ attempts to redress the military imbalance can only prompt 
traditional powers to reinforce their capabilities.  
 
The results of such a vicious circle will be rising political tensions, wasted resources, or 
worse – war by accident or inadvertence. Globalization is seen by some as a possible way 
to get out of this, because it would converge the diverging interests of the different 
countries and tie them together. But similarly to the Prisoners Dilemma, a win-win game 
requires a basis of trust, and exactly that is what is lacking, especially after September 11. 
The idea of pre-emptive wars in name of democracy for all may sound attractive, but 
even when the intentions in such a war are totally pure, there is of course an intrinsic 
“democracy deficit” paradox in any attempt to establish global democracy by force.  
   
Not only war, but also crime threatens security. The term globalization has been used 
primarily to describe some key aspects of the recent transformation of world economic 
activity. But several other, definitely less benign, activities, including the drug trade, 
terrorism, and traffic from humans to nuclear materials, have also been globalized. The 
liberalization that works toward a borderless world is also helping international criminals.  
Next to crime, disease is also globalizing. Global cooperation has eradicated smallpox, 
and it has eliminated tuberculosis and cholera from most places; but now the world is 
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struggling to prevent the resurgence of these diseases and to control the global spread of 
AIDS.  
 
‘Security’ in the broadest sense, is about more than war, crime, and disease. There is 
growing concern over the threats to stability that could arise from non-military, non-
criminal factors. The economic turbulence of recent times highlights the global 
interdependency of economic processes. Factors on the one side of the globe can 
seriously undermine economic security in the other side. Renewed efforts to improve 
coordination in policy in the interests of achieving more stable conditions for investment 
are undertaken to reduce the spiraling dynamics of a global economy without global 
governance. In the globalizing world, competition becomes more intense. In this world, 
social security is no longer viewed as an honorable achievement, the crown on the 
process of economic development, but as a burden, hampering flexibility, halting 
innovation, perverting incentive structures, keeping wages at a high level, decreasing 
labor participation and increasing the tax burden. In other words: social security is 
increasingly seen as a competitive disadvantage in a global economy. To what extent that 
view is justified is an important question. Social security systems are in fact an 
indispensable factor providing institutionalized solidarity, fostering trust and creating 
social capital, which is of paramount importance in individualistic western societies with 
complex economies consisting of countless smooth transactions between numerous more 
or less anonymous participants. 
 
As has become clear, security has many dimensions, and all are importantly determining 
the well-being of people. Collective security, as envisaged in the UN Charter, is based on 
the idea of members in a particular group renouncing the use of force among themselves 
while pledging to defend any member of the group attacked by external forces. It is 
inherently military focused. Comprehensive security, on the other hand, emphasizes 
changing the present military- based notion of security. Among its dominant ideas are co-
operation, confidence- building, transparency, gradual disarmament, conversion, 
demobilization, and demilitarization. Recently, a new concept – human security – has 
received attention. This is a people-centered approach that is concerned not so much with 
war or weapons as with basic human dignity. In recent the Human Development Reports, 
human security includes safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and 
repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of 
daily life. The reason for the broadening of the security-concept is not only our higher 
ambitions in this area. It also shows that the types of risks have changed. The new 
dangers are not coming from outside but from inside, from our very own system.  
 
The sociologist Anthony Giddens uses the term ‘manufactured risks’ for this: events that, 
though caused by human action, nevertheless seem as inevitable and unavoidable as 
natural phenomena like an earthquake or a flood. Risks can roughly be divided into two 
types. External risks in principle and in essence originate from non-human factors, even 
though human factors may influence the specific consequences of these risks; for 
example bad harvests due to bad weather (which could have been mitigated by the human 
decision of not practicing monoculture), floods caused by storms (which could have been 
prevented by the human action of building proper dykes), illness and death by diseases 
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like the plague (which is aggravated by human factors like mobility, urbanization and 
lack of hygiene). Manufactured risks are in principle and in essence created by human 
factors, even though nature may play a significant role in these risks, and even though 
human actors do not recognize or acknowledge the human factor or feel that human 
actors cannot influence the risk; for example unemployment (an inevitable feature of 
modern economic systems), loosing market share due to globalization, dying because of 
technological development (for example in a car-accident), dying because of BSE (which 
is caused by the efficient human production-system in which cows are recycled via cattle-
food), being flooded because of melting ice caps due to global warming (which is a 
change in nature, but it is at least partly caused by human behavior leading to increased 
CO2 in the atmosphere). The main challenge of mankind today seems to be to control the 
consequences of its own (aggregate) behavior. This challenge is more urgent than before: 
because of globalization, the impact and reach of the consequences of man’s behavior has 
strongly increased, whereas his control over them has decreased.  
 
Global governance in the area of direct security (defense) is mainly to be found with the 
NATO and the United Nations who can issue charters and send troops to certain areas for 
certain tasks. These troops have to be provided by nation-states though, and the 
fragmented lines of command do not improve chances of successful performance. To 
keep any check on these activities there are rules for law and a court: the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague which is growing in importance but still almost completely 
dependent on the adherence and support of nation-states. In the area of global terrorism, 
the national Intelligence Services (CIA and clones of it in other countries) cooperate to 
some extent, but given the sensitivity of the intelligence work this is a difficult 
cooperation. As to international or global crime, there are organizations like Interpol and 
Europe that offer a platform for cooperation of national police. As to the wider concept of 
security, there is nothing close to ‘global social security’, save the work of developmental 
aid organizations. The global management of ‘manufactured risks’ such as 
unemployment and pollution are adopted by a variety of actors at the international level, 
with limited success and impact. 
 
 
1.3.  The Global Environment 
 
An already mentioned important concern of global scale is the environment, which is 
closely linked to economic development and population growth. Human activities have 
adverse – and sometimes irreversible – environmental impacts, and the world needs to 
manage its activities to keep the adverse outcomes within prudent boundaries, and to 
redress current imbalances. Grave environmental problems beyond national remedy, such 
as greenhouse warming, ozone depletion and, in some cases, natural disasters, have 
linked the fate of nations more closely together – even if some are still ‘in denial’ on this. 
Both affluence and poverty contribute to environmentally wasteful behavior. Population 
pressure, in combination with economic growth, will do the rest. It seems not realistic to 
halt economic growth (as the ‘zero-growth’ advocates plead for), and even if it were 
possible it would maybe not even be a desirable option. Economic growth is a relatively 
peaceful way of human competition, it is canalizing human energies in getting more by 
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making more, not by taking more (from someone else, in a zero-sum game or worse). 
Though halting economic growth may be undesirable and even impossible, bending 
economic growth it is not impossible.  Changing the direction of economic growth 
toward a more sustainable way seems the only feasible solution. This is unlikely to 
happen by itself and in any way has to be accelerated, to control the environmental 
damage as much as possible. Consuming behavior can be changed (as the booming 
marketing and advertising sector shows) and is already changing – but slow. Green 
investment, eco-products, green energy: these are signs of a change, but no more than 
that. 
 
More people have been added to the world’s population in the past five decades than in 
all the previous millennia of human existence. The overall world economy8 has grown 
and will keep growing. This in combination with the related multiplication of population 
will eventually create a world economy many times larger than today’s. This has severe 
consequences for the environment that are partly irreversible, and there is ecological limit 
to this. In addition there may very well be a socio-biological limit to this, as animal 
experiments have shown (above a certain concentration of rats in a cage, they become 
stressed and either get depressed and passive, or aggressive, attacking other rats). 
Unfortunately these types of limits will probably only be acknowledged when the world 
has crossed them and feels the consequences, with the ones in power feeling these last.   
 
In any scenario, major changes in economic practices will have to occur. Though many of 
the people in power realize this, they do often not agree on the timing, the nature and the 
(structural) extent of the changes needed and especially not on the way that the burden of 
the costs of these changes has to be distributed. The globalization process is an important 
factor of these problems, because it is globalizing the western production and 
consumption patterns. In addition it is an important obstacle to possible solutions, by 
limiting the space for long-term considerations because of the increasing pressure of 
short-term problems (due to increased competition, decreased solidarity). The issue is 
hence often postponed, ignored or sometimes even denied by politicians, afraid of 
endangering the country’s economic power in an increasingly global competitive 
environment.  
 
The links among poverty, population, consumption, and environment and the systemic 
nature of their interactions have become clearer. System change is very difficult to 
achieve in a non-revolutionary way. It requires integrated, global approaches to manage 
this type of problems. 
 
 
1.4. Global Culture 
 
As interactions of people are increasing as the result of international business and 
increased mobility in general, and media like television, radio, cinema and Internet are 
spreading, the question arises what this means for culture. There are roughly two 
                                                 
8 ‘World economy’ is the economy of the world, all economies together, which has to be distinguished 
from ‘global economy’ referring to the part of the economy that is worldwide. 
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positions in this. On the one hand, it is thought that cultural variety and indigenous values 
suffer as homogenization is promoted by global exposure to entertainment industries and 
other transmitters of Western lifestyle, like fast food chains (‘McDonaldization’). On the 
other hand, it is thought that the increased interaction between different cultures can 
enrich culture in general, because it creates dynamic meeting points and new ‘fusion’ 
culture, as is observable in cooking, fashion, art. Local and regional cultures are not 
threatened but get an impulse when finding new ways of expression via the different 
media, strengthening existing cultural communities and enabling to build new cultural 
communities that are not geographically bound, for example virtual communities on the 
Internet. Globalization in this view would in fact stimulate and enrich culture; a global 
culture is not necessarily a homogenous culture.  
 
As often, both views contain elements of truth, showing again that globalization has (at 
least) two faces, that there are cultural costs and benefits so to speak, and that the 
question is how to balance these most favorable. It is important not to deny the inherent 
dynamic character of culture, and its encompassing fluid nature. It is not a variable that 
can be easily controlled. On the contrary, it can even be argued that globalization itself in 
fact is an element of culture, to be more precise: of modern Western culture. Many other 
cultures do not share the idea of a necessarily expanding world order; it is a typical 
feature of Western societies, reflecting Enlightenment ideals about the nature of progress.  
  
Huntington (1996) in the Clash of Civilizations cites: “There can be no true friends 
without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. 
These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century and more of 
sentimental cant.” For people seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are 
essential. According to Huntington it is the need for cultural identity that is shaping the 
dynamics of globalization, as much or more than economic forces. He states that the most 
important distinctions among people nowadays are not ideological, political or economic, 
but cultural Individuals and nations are trying to answer the most basic question humans 
face: who are we? And by are answering that question in the traditional way human 
beings have answered it, by reference to things that define their identity and give 
meaning to their world: ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, 
institutions. People use politics not only to advance their interests but also to define their 
identity. This is often referred to as ‘identity politics’. The same is true for economic 
behavior, and one could speak of ‘identity economics’ (Weehuizen 2003). 
Huntington’s main message is: we know who we are only when we know who we are 
not; and we know what we are for often only if we know whom we are against. 
According to him, the conflicts of today and the future are in essence cultural conflicts 
 
 
1.5. Global Media 
 
New information and communications technology, in addition to driving economic 
globalization and social transformation, have also transformed the media world and the 
spread of information, with important consequences for national as well as global 
governance. This began with radio broadcasting in the 1940s and has since been extended 
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through television and satellite transmission to give even those in remote places 
immediate access to sound and images from a wider world. In some countries, new 
communications systems have even brought people news of domestic events that is not 
available locally. Direct-dial international telephone and fax services have swelled the 
transborder flow of news and other messages. The Internet allows communication and the 
sharing of information between computers around the world. 
 
Exposure through the media to foreign cultures and life-styles can be both stimulating 
and destabilizing; it can inspire both appreciation and envy. The concern that the 
dominance of transnational media could result in cultural homogenization and could 
damage indigenous cultures is not limited to non-Western countries. Comparable to the 
environmental question, many people also in western societies have the ideal of 
maintaining ‘cultural biodiversity’. Many people are worried that media images will 
strengthen the consumerist ethos in societies in the early stages of development. There 
are questions about distortion and imbalance as the world’s news is filtered 
predominantly through Western prisms, and dissatisfaction that information flows from 
and within the developing world are inadequate. Apprehension about concentration in 
media ownership is linked to worries that this sector’s power to shape the agenda of 
political action may not be matched by a sense of responsibility.  
 
The wider access to information is potentially and actually good for democracy, which 
gains from a better- informed citizenry, as well as beneficial for development, scientific 
and professional collaboration, and many other activities. But although there has been a 
spectacular expansion in the reach of some communications media, serious imbalances 
remain in access to information and in the distribution of even the most basic technology. 
Two billion people – more than one in three individuals in the world – still lack 
electricity. In 1990, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria together had 
fewer telephone connections than Canada, which has only 27 million people.  
 
Still, the wide linkages now facilitated help pull the world’s people closer together, at 
least in terms of awareness. Media images of human suffering have motivated people to 
express their concern and their solidarity with those in distant places by contributing to 
relief efforts and by demanding explanations and action from governments. The media's 
influence on the shaping of foreign policy is considerable in many countries. 
 
Famine and extreme poverty are broadcast to the rich, but the lifestyles of the rich also 
are broadcast to the poor. The extremes are more evident. The long-term consequences of 
extreme and highly visible global inequalities between countries, classes and individuals 
are difficult to predict. The social fabric of some countries has proved extraordinarily 
elastic in the face of economic extremes, the US being the most obvious case. But it is 
difficult to believe that global structures are similarly stable since there is no unifying 
political consensus and only a weak structure of global governance. 
 
 
1.6. A Global Perspective? 
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The capitalist market economy has proved to be the most powerful engine for economic 
growth. It is the moving force behind the present globalization of the world economy. It 
is so strong because it uses individual desire for material gain in an effective way, 
harnessing that desire in a system of competitive pricing and flexible markets, leading to 
high growth in welfare for the community as a whole. There is wide-spread criticism to 
this idea of an ‘invisible hand’ transforming egoistic motives into a better world for all. 
The universalistic claim of this line of thinking is under increasing pressure because of 
globalization. By confronting the capitalist system with essentially different systems, 
globalization unmasks it as being an in essence local system, formed in a certain cultural 
and socio-economic context (western Christian industrialized societies) in a specific 
period of time (the last two centuries). 
 
This in principal ‘local socio-economic system’ however is quite contagious and has 
spread rapidly, overtaking other systems from the outside or from the inside. The 
capitalist system gives a strong impulse to materialistic and egoistic inclinations, which 
are universal indeed. Sulak Savaraksa, a prominent Buddhist thinker and activist 
expressed his deep concern seeing how during his lifetime, Buddhist values of 
spirituality, harmony and friendliness have been turned around and completely 
overwhelmed by market capitalism in Thailand (Savaraksa 1992). He saw people being 
captured by a feverish strife for greater material wealth, which at least in his view was 
not necessarily leading to a better quality of life or more happiness. The capitalist system 
is opposed to Buddhist virtues of sobriety and overcoming of self-interest. He calls this 
‘consumerism’ and sees it as a pseudo-religion, and poses the question of the trade-off 
between material gains of the poor in Thailand and the spiritual loss.  
 
Similar concerns seem to lie behind ‘Islamic economics’, which aims to restructure 
economic thought and practice on the basis of fundamental Islamic teachings. As for 
example Kuran (1996) argues, its main purpose is to prevent Muslims from assimilating 
into the emerging global Western culture, not to improve economic performance. Since 
interest, insurance, speculation, indexing and other basic success factors of capitalist 
practices are considered contrary to the Islam, economic performance indeed is impeded 
by taking the Islam as a basis. The observation that in fact the capitalist system is based 
on a particular religious body of thought is to some extent correct. In medieval 
Christianity, interest on loans was forbidden and striving for worldly possessions was not 
considered a good thing. As Max Weber (1930) has shown, the new Christian branches of 
Protestantism and Calvinism changed this. Working hard and accumulating capital was 
seen as a virtue, fulfilling the duty God had put on man to not waste things and to make 
the most out of life. Weber showed how the religious spirit, which was the basis of this 
attitude, vanished as wealth increased. Capitalism rests on ‘mechanical foundations’ 
according to Weber, it has a self-perpetuating incentive-system, and once the mechanics 
are set into motion by (Calvinist) spirit cleaning away moral barriers, the religious 
support is no longer needed.  
 
However, capitalism is under continuous attack, not only for practical reasons (the 
environment) but also because of doubts on the fundamental underlying assumption of 
the system. More welfare does not necessarily bring more well-being, and it can at some 
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point even decrease well-being, as research from within and without economics shows 
(Scitovsky 1976, Easterlin 1974, Inglehart 1995). Since the religious justification of hard 
work and capital accumulation has disappeared in the process, the low correlation 




1.7. Global Democracy? 
 
An overwhelming change has taken place in the past decades on the level of political 
order of many societies. Authoritarian regimes of various sorts have largely given way to 
(at least nominal) liberal constitutional democracies. These are roughly defined by equal 
political participation rights of all citizens, the guarantee of human, civic and political 
rights, and the accountability of governing elites. This global phenomenon of mass 
transition to democracy was partly driven by the ideals associated with the democratic 
regime form.  
 
What are these ideals, what is democracy deemed ‘good for’, or capable of 
accomplishing? Offe (2000) comes with four cumulative answers. First there is the 
‘liberal’ achievement of rights and liberties being guaranteed and the drawing of a clear 
demarcating line between what can or should be subject to discussion, deliberation and 
decision in the political system and what not, because it is forming the basis of the very 
system itself, laid down in the constitution. As a consequence of both rights and 
procedures being guaranteed in both principle and practice (through the judicial system), 
democracies enable a non-violent, limited, civilized character of political conflict and 
more in general, incremental change (as opposed to revolutionary change). 
 
A second reason for the moral attraction of the democratic regime form is its 
‘international’ accomplishment, expressed in the ‘democratic peace’-hypothesis dating 
back to Kant (1795). It posits that democracies will not wage war against other 
democracies. It must be noted however that in a world of international regimes and 
alliances, democracy everywhere is not a necessary condition for international peace.  
 
Third, there is the ‘social progress’ accomplishment. Democracies rest upon majority 
rule, and majorities are typically made up of the less privileged segments of the 
populations (elites are by definition small and a minority), who are able to affect the size 
and distribution of economic resources, through policy, taxation, social security. 
Democracy by its design would in principle promote social justice and social and 
economic dynamics. 
 
Finally there is the ‘republican’ accomplishment of (forms of) the democratic system, the 
ability of transforming ‘subjects’ into ‘citizens’: agents committed to and capable of 
                                                 
9 Clearly, in poor countries and for poor people, money makes a huge difference. Until a certain level of 
income, material gain is strongly correlated with increases in well-being, but above that level the 
correlation drops, and happiness is much more correlated with other, non-economic factors such as the 
amount and quality of social relations, and even with certain genes. 
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employing their cognitive and moral resources to solve political problems, according to a 
logic of collective learning, and striving for the ‘public good’. 
 
Democratization was not just pulled by those reasons and the hopes attached to them, it 
was also pushed by causes. The internal instability of many authoritarian regime forms 
and their general failure to deal with domestic and international challenges made 
democracy the regime form chosen ‘by default’, as a compromise. When none of the 
different national elites competing for power manages to become the strongest, then ‘the 
people’ remain the only conceivable bearer of sovereignty. This choice is influenced by 
two types of external agents: pressures and encouragements from other liberal democratic 
nations and their supranational organizations, and preferences of investors for operating 
under regime forms which meet the minimum requirements of rule of law, security of 
contract and accountability of political elites. 
 
However, the growth of democratic regimes has been accompanied by a sense of 
disenchantment. The new wave of democratization has not brought all that was hoped 
for. It used to be argued by democratic theorists that an advanced economy is a 
determinant or a prerequisite of democracy, and that in turn democracy will enhance the 
potential for growth and prosperity, in a mutual feedback loop. It turned out this was not 
necessarily the case. Neither economic progress, nor social justice and civic involvement, 
are automatically promoted by a democratic system. Offe (2000) points out that as the 
number of democracies increase, their quality seems to decrease, giving rise to well-
founded complaints of democracies having degenerated into mere ‘electoralist’ or 
‘delegative’ democracies, or even downright defective democracies controlled as a 
privilege by non-accountable elites. Not all regimes labeled as a form of democracy are 
democratic, and moreover, a democratic regime form may be an indispensable 
prerequisite but evidently not an automatic assurance of the highly valued qualities 
generally associated with it. 
 
Democratization (in its various forms) of the nation state is a global phenomenon. 
However hat does not necessarily mean that democracy also is assured at the trans- or 
supranational level, as the example of the European Union shows. A bunch of 
democracies together do not automatically form some kind of (meta-)democracy. 
Dahl and Tufte (1973) pointed out the contradictions between democracy and the need 
for political institutions that can cope with problems that flow across political boundaries. 
Democracy is most compatible with small political units because these provide more 
opportunity for citizens to participate effectively and meaningfully. On the other hand, 
larger political systems are required to cope with large-scale problems. At the same time 
that transnational units will increase the capacity of the system to handle critical 
problems, transnational units will also increase the ineffectuality and powerlessness of 
the individual citizen. Democratic theory has never been good in offering useful guidance 
about the appropriate relations among different democratic units. Rather than conceiving 
democracy as locate in a particular kind of inclusive sovereign unit, upscaling it to a 
global level, Dahl and Tufte (1973) argue we must learn to conceive of a democracy 
spreading through a set of interrelated political systems. The central problem is no longer 
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to find suitable rules, like the majority principle, to apply within a sovereign unit, but to 
find suitable rules to apply among a variety of units, none of which is sovereign. 
These units do not necessarily have to be nation states, on the contrary; the size of nation-
states is not ideal for democratic participation. Considerable research is directed at 
networked local communities and especially at cities and urban regions, connecting to 
other cities in other countries, developing into a transnational network of cooperation, 
thought in practice nation states are by far still the most dominant actors. 
 
 
1.8. Global Law? 
 
In 1948 the International Court of justice observed: “the progressive increase in the 
collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon the 
international plane by certain entities which are not States” (Noortmann 2002). The rise 
and proliferation of non-state actors have since then developed beyond the Court’s 
imagination. Beside international organization, NGOs and multinationals, there are 
transnational criminal organizations,  
 
Globalization, and the growing role of non-state actors in this pose serious challenges to 
international law. Law in general is traditionally conceptualized within the framework of 
nation states, and international law dealt with states among each other. According to 
Giddens (2000), globalization is not only changing the way the world looks, but also (and 
necessarily) the way we look at the world. With respect to the theoretical framework for 
international law, globalization is not a completely new or different development 
requiring the development of totally new theoretical approaches. Nevertheless, it poses 
enormous conceptual and practical challenges to stretch the existing legal frameworks to 
accommodate the developments associated with globalization. The legal framework is 
national in orientation (even when it is international), and it has important pillars such as 
a Constitution, the possibility of enforcement, a system of jurisdictions, that at a global 
level is not to be found. Already mentioned in former paragraphs is the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague, Interpol and Europol, WTO, IMF, the World Bank. The 
European Union is an example of a ‘law’ making institute at a truly supranational level, 
but nevertheless it is the nation-states in the EU that are deciding on European laws.  
 
There is no ‘global law’, merely a variety of international regulation, and a range of 
multi- or bi-lateral treaties, pacts and agreements. And importantly, there is nothing like a 
global enforcement system not depending on nation-states. 
 
At the same time though, the position of states is eroded, and many other actors are 
increasingly influential at the international level. Globalization as a legal term refers to 
legal and de facto denationalization – of markets, laws, and politics. International 
(economic) relations are not primarily concerned anymore with the coordination of 
competing state interests, but with the conservation, distribution and protection of global 
public goods. A legal structure for global governance therefore has to try to identify and 






It is not so long ago that globalization was predominantly viewed as a good thing, 
allowing developing countries to catch up and join the game, and ideally bringing peace 
and prosperity to everyone. A global economy supposedly could optimally profit from 
differences in comparative advantages in different areas in the world, and globalization 
would diminish transaction costs in terms of political, social, cultural and linguistic 
barriers. Moreover, a global economy would create such far-going and intrinsic 
interdependencies between economic processes, that no country would dream to start a 
war against another; because by harming the other it would harm itself. Interests would 
largely converge in a global economy ending in an overall win-win construction, and this 
would help to create the next ideal: a global society, a ‘global world’. 
 
These ideas changed quite abruptly and drastically. Apparently somewhere in the 1990s, 
globalization became a problem. It had become clear that a global economy in fact was 
highly problematic and by no means was automatically leading to win-win situations. 
Protests from a wide variety of groups gave voice to the ‘losers’ of the globalization 
process. But though at some point the problem was generally recognized, there was less 
consensus on the cure.  
 
Roughly two ‘camps’ can be distinguished in the discussion. Both agreed that the costs 
and benefits of globalization were unevenly distributed. Based on that, one ‘camp’ 
concluded that the process of globalization should be halted and even reversed. The other 
concluded exactly the opposite: the real problem was that globalization was not complete, 
the world was facing symptoms not of a disease but of a transition-process; and in fact 
globalization should be speeded up, not slowed down.   
 
Of course there are many standpoints between these two extreme views. The aim of this 
section was to give a brief but by no means exhaustive overview of the elements of 
globalization, and to touch on the main themes in the discussion on globalization. 
Without taking a clear position in this debate, it seems safe to say that halting or even 
reversing the globalization process is not an option. However, it seems equally naïve to 
assume that more globalization would solve the problems caused by globalization in the 
first place. A globalized world by no means has to be a good, just, ‘civil’ world.  
The real question thus is not “to globalize or not to globalize”, but: how to globalize? 









What kinds of institutions are best suited to cope with global problems, such as outlined 
in the previous section? What configuration of agents might at all be capable of doing 
whatever ‘is to be done’ at a global level? To address the question of global governance, 
we need first to address the question of governance more in general. 
 
Although there is much debate on the need to re-invent government, the issue of 
governance is much broader: how might societies - governments, corporate entities and 
civil society together – become more effective in arriving at desirable collective 
outcomes. In this section, we present two ‘trans-disciplinary’ frameworks with which the 
problem of global governance can be better analyzed and understood: the exit-voice-
loyalty framework, and the state-government-community framework.  
 
A recent OECD publication, titled Governance in the 21st Century (OECD 2001) sets out 
to trace a path to the new forms of governance that are likely to emerge as a result of 
long-run economic, technological and social transformations. It highlights three broad 
themes: (1) old forms of public and private governance are proving increasingly 
ineffective; (2) the new forms of governance will involve a much wider range of active 
participants; (3) the rigid modes of power concentration and distribution that characterize 
most existing organizations seem destined to give way to more flexible and dynamic 
methods in the future.  
 
The report addresses the much-debated issue of the decline of the nation-state. For more 
than 300 years, the nation-state has been accepted as the key political actor in developed 
industrial societies. In a global society, however, national governments seem destined to 
become only one of many decision-making nodes, in a vast network. Setting and 
achieving goals, be it in a specific community or planet-wide, will depend on a constantly 
changing constellation of collaborative efforts. Fostering shared values will be a crucial 
part of making this type of network decision making workable. 
 
To adapt to these changes, public and private organizations will need to be able to 
regularly redistribute responsibilities according to the nature of the task at hand, rather 
than on the basis of rigid hierarchies. A redistribution of authority and a major leap in the 
acceptance of experimentation with this seem to be the crucial ingredients for realizing 
the benefits of the present changes, the OECD report concludes. 
 
It is necessary to gain more understanding of governance and its components more in 
general, before going over to the global level. Claus Offe (2000) and Richard Nelson 
(2002) both offer an insightful overview of the issue of building social order. They build 
on the classical triad of state, market and community that are constantly realigning in an 
unclear process of transforming the division of labor concerning governance. We start 
though discussing the exit-voice framework of Albert Hirschman. Hirschman developed 
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this framework originally to explain the behavior of firms, but is has proven to have 
strong analytical power for many other issues and is used in different areas. In the 
following account ‘consumer’ can to a large extent be replaced by ‘citizen’ and ‘firm’ by 
‘government’. 
 
2.1. Exit, voice and loyalty 
 
In his famous work Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970), Albert Hirschman introduces the 
concepts of exit and voice as two possible responses to a decline in product quality. He 
suggests that economists tend to concentrate upon the exit function as a signal to firms 
that customers are unhappy with a product. Consumers may exit under two conditions: 
when the price gets too high, and when the quality declines. The latter is Hirschman's 
more immediate concern. When consumers exit following price rises, the firm might not 
react as higher profits may be obtained from fewer customers at the higher prices. Quality 
decline causing exit to other rival firms should lead to a reaction from the producers as 
they try to maintain market share. These are the signals markets give to firms, and 
Hirschman argues that the relationship between exit and the reaction function of firms is 
crucial for this signaling system to work. If demand is inelastic then the exit signals of 
consumers’ concerns about quality deterioration will not appear; if demand is very elastic 
and exit too spontaneous, the firm may not have time to react before bankruptcy. Thus he 
suggests a mix of alert and inert consumers is required, for an initial early sign without a 
mass exit. This model is not only applicable to quality decline in products, but also to 
differential quality across products (Barry 1974).  
 
Exit may be an efficient means of signaling consumer demands in perfect markets, but 
with monopoly supply there is nowhere for consumers to go. Similarly, if the quality of a 
product deteriorates across firms in a market simultaneously, consumers may be 
constantly exiting from one firm’s product to rivals without ever attaining satisfaction 
and no signals will be received by any of the firms as their exiting customers are replaced 
by others switching from a rival firm’s shoddy products. Here the only means of 
signaling discontent is to express concerns verbally.  
 
Hirschman defines voice as: “any attempt to change, rather than to escape from, on 
objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the 
management directly in charge, through appeal to higher authority with the intention of 
forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, 
including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion.” (1970: 30). 
 
As with exit, a firm needs time to be able to respond to complaints, leading Hirschman to 
suggest that voice can become too ‘loud’ but that generally the louder the voice the more 
likely the firm will respond. Voice may require some alert citizens to complain, and some 
inert ones to provide a bedrock of stability. There are obvious advantages to voice over 
exit. Exit is a fairly crude, binary response. Voice responses can be more subtle. 
Consumers may express more clearly what they desire, and can verbalize the intensity of 
their dissatisfaction more easily. Operationally, exit is dichotomous, voice a continuous 
variable. One may only signal disapproval by exiting to a rival product on offer, but one 
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may voice the sort of products one might like. Of course voice is also problematic. Talk 
can be cheap, but ‘actions speak louder than words’. Cheap talk may only reveal strategic 
preferences rather than genuine ‘naïve; ones, and whilst exit may also be used for 
strategic purposes in some contexts, because it is not so subtle it is less easy to exercise it 
for manipulating. 
 
The relative costs of voice and exit are of course crucial to any analysis. Exiting from one 
product to another when both are next to one another on a supermarket shelf is costless, 
whereas complaining about the product may be very inconvenient. In other contexts, 
exiting is very costly, switching jobs for example or moving house, Voice is often more 
costly than exit with less assured results. But voice may also be costless. If a market 
researcher knocks at your door asking for your views on given products for example, 
giving your opinion may even bring non-pecuniary benefits of ‘speaking one’s mind’ to a 
ready listener. A distinction can be made between ‘vertical voice’ – talking to the 
superiors or to a firm – and ‘horizontal voice’ – talking to one’s friends, neighbors, 
colleagues (O’Donnell 1986). Generally vertical voice is more costly and has some 
psychological costs (the stress of speaking critically to superiors), while horizontal voice 
generally is not very costly, and has psychological benefits of expressing, sharing.  
The relative costs and relative benefits of the exit and voice will vary massively across 
contexts. 
 
Whereas economics has focused mainly on exit, political science has focused on voice. 
Hirschman points out however that this analytical specialization is a mistake; exit and 
voice in practice always work together in both economic and political contexts. The 
relationship between the two is complex. On the one hand, voice can be more effective is 
there is a threat of exit; on the other hand, if exit is easy, then consumers may not bother 
with voice and just shift products. Exit possibilities may thus tend to ‘atrophy the art of 
voice’. This is a key aspect for the applications of the exit-voice framework.  
 
There are two ways in which exit can affect the use of voices. First, exit can atrophy it, as 
consumers do not learn how to use voice effectively since they choose the easier and less 
(individually) costly exit option. It is important to realize that at the collective level the 
costs may be much higher, since exit minimizes learning potential of organizations and 
economies – exit only gives information about wanting a certain possibility or not, 
nothing more. Second, exit may ‘drive out’ voice, in the sense that the ‘alert’ who might 
have voiced, exit instead, leaving behind the ‘inert’ who then suffer in silence.  
 
Loyalty is the most difficult concept in Hirschman’s framework. Hirschman introduced 
the concept of loyalty to try to understand why exit is virtually ruled out in certain 
contexts such as the family, tribe, church and state. Loyalty clearly makes exit less likely, 
but does not necessarily give more room to voice. Loyalty serves as a brake on exit, 
preventing it from occurring when its use would otherwise be rational. Thus, loyalty 
often tends to activate voice. 
 
In general, the choice of an individual for exercising exit or voice depends on the relative 
costs, including the balancing of the uncertainty of voice (will it change anything) and the 
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uncertainty of exit (you know what you’ve got, but you don’t know what you’ll get). 
Many factors play a role in this, including the position and influence of an individual, 
psychological preference or resistance to change, emotional attachments.  
 
Loyalty to a group depends upon one’s identification with the group. One can feel 
‘American’ or ‘French’ or ‘Japanese’ and be loyal to the country no matter how much 
one disagrees with the policies of the government of that country. To exit from your own 
country (region, city, organization, family) just because of disagreeing with policy of the 
government (management, family-members) is a painful, emotionally costly process. 
Loyalty does not normally mean a mere reluctance to leave a collectivity, but rather a 
positive commitment to further its welfare by working for it, fighting for it, changing it 
for the better (Barry 1974). Loyalty depends on the extent one identifies with something, 
and the extent to which one has invested in something (things tend to become more 
valuable if one has to put effort in acquiring them). Identification depends on the degree 
that something is experienced as constituent part of the self. You may find it hard to leave 
the house in which you were born, even if it is falling apart and there are much better 
houses available. The company you worked for the last 20 years, the nation of which you 
are part – all these things are important part of your self-definition, and giving them up 
means loosing part of your identity.  
 
Loyalty is changing the odds for exit and voice, in favor of voice. This is not always a 
positive characteristic, as is clear in the case of for example a woman staying with her 
alcoholic husband who beats her up regularly; the employee who stays with his company 
even though he gets a miserable pay; the soldier who dies for his country in a war he 
doesn’t believe in. 
 
The things people get attached to and which have become part of their identity to some 
extent, are always things representing ‘past voice’. People tend to attach to the things 
they have worked for, on, at – be it a relationship, a company or a country. A fight often 
strengthens a personal relationship, an employee can give voice to his ideas about the 
product or service of his company, a citizen literally has a ‘vote’ in his country. In 
addition to the specific content of what is voiced, the very act of voice is important: it is 
signaling that someone cares, and in addition (though not necessarily) is willing to invest 
in the object of his voice. Investing in turn increases identification and therefore loyalty; 
an employee who helps improving the company’s product or increasing the company’s 
sales will identify with the company because it is partly made of his (her) work, effort 
and ideas; a soldier who is fighting for his country will identify more with it because he 
has risked his life for it and it has become an important part of his being – not in terms 
causality (it is important, so I will risk my life for it) or cognitive dissonance and post-
rationalization (I risked my life for my country, so – ruling out the possibility that I am 
crazy – my country must be very important), but rather in psychological development 
terms (I am partly shaped by my experiences, and fighting for my country was a very 
important experience which shaped me and which has become a part of my identity).  
So voice creates commitment, which creates identification, which creates loyalty. The 
next step is less clear. Past voice leads to present loyalty, but present loyalty does not 
necessarily lead to future voice. However it does influence the relative exit-voice 
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tendencies with individuals who share satisfaction levels but differ in amount of loyalty 
(via the intermediating variables of commitment and investment). 
 
The exit-voice-loyalty framework is applied to a wide range of issues. In political science 
it is used for comparative politics, for example when analyzing the changes in East-
European countries after the fall of the Wall, which suddenly saw en increase in both exit 
and voice options. In social psychology it is used as both an analytic and predictive tool 
to examine social relations at work, within and between groups, and in romance. For 
example, Tajfel (1974) uses it to describe how people respond to membership of 
underprivileged and disadvantaged groups in society, such as ethnic minorities. They can 
either ‘exit’ through upward social mobility, for example when a person from an ethnic 
minority moves into a profession traditionally occupied by whites, Or they can try to 
raise the status of their entire group through social change, using voice (“I have a 
dream…” or “Black is beautiful”) 
 
For the issue of global governance, the application in political science is especially 
interesting. The exit-voice-loyalty (EVL) framework has been used in urban studies, as 
an extension of the Tiebout (1956) model. Tiebout suggested that if there were a large 
number of local jurisdictions in a single metropolitan area, they could compete for 
households by offering different tax-services packages. ‘Citizen-consumers’ would then 
‘vote with their feet’ by moving interjurisdictionally to the local government which 
offered the preferred tax-service mix. At a larger scale something similar can be said 
about different countries offering different possibilities, thereby consciously or 
unconsciously competing for citizens. The packages developed rich countries offer their 
citizens are clearly relatively attractive; hence the continuous migration from South to 
North (and in Europe also from East to West). But also between the rich countries there is 
competition, with as clearest example the ‘brain drain’ by the US, attracting the most 
talented and most highly educated individuals from other countries by offering them 
special opportunities. 
 
In urban studies literature, there are two main camps. The fragmentationist position holds 
that fragmentation of metropolitan government promotes efficiency through the 
competition of local governments, in addition to giving the citizen-consumer a choice to 
determine for him or her self what is important. However, the low-income households 
have no exit option and therefore their voice has not much backing (they have no way to 
go anyway). The consolidationists argue that the voice-option should be strengthened for 
all, not only for those with high incomes. They find no evidence to suggest a relationship 
between fragmented government structures and efficiency. However, neither is there 
much evidence for the superiority of their own solution. They introduce a fourth 
category, of ‘neglect’. This refers to the phenomenon that individuals do not make use of 
enlarge voice options even if it clearly is in their advantage and has not real costs. The 
explanation for this can be found in mechanisms such as ‘learned helplessness’, (dis)trust, 
cynicism, lack of identification.   
 
In global governance, there is no ‘exit’ option. This simple observation has many 
consequences. It means that global governance has to be predominantly a system of 
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voice. By democratic involvement of all parties, the system of voice can generate a 
certain ‘global loyalty’, which will support additional future voice instead of the neglect 
or withdrawal option. 
 
In the following paragraphs, three main spheres of governance will be explored: market, 
state and community. These are related to exit, voice and loyalty, but not in a 
straightforward way. Exit roughly is associated with the type of rationale that is dominant 
in markets (choice: A or B, yes or no). Voice is often associated with political structures, 
be they for the public good (as in the democratic state, elections and participation), or for 
a smaller scale public good (firms having employee representation and customer 
satisfaction surveys). Loyalty is generally coupled to community, since it involves social-
psychological attachments (loyalty to a product is in fact also a community phenomenon, 
it is related to life-style, being part of the Coca-cola experience or the Nike-community) 
 
 
2.2. State, market and community 
 
Questions of institutional formation and reform are conventionally framed in terms of 
which spheres of life should be governed by the state, the market or the community. 
Concerning this ever contested division of domains, social scientists, on the basis of their 
professional expertise, have little privileged insights to offer. At best, they can elaborate 
on the basis of empirical observations and the analysis of causal mechanisms, as well as 
feasibility and consistency assessments, some critical arguments that can inform 
judgment on these matters.  
 
What to avoid is more obvious than what to actually do, according to Offe (2000). Old 
design options are obsolete regardless of whether we already know this or are in the 
process of slowly coming to understand this. Old design options are typically monistic, 
relying on the state, the market or the community as the ultimate guarantors of social 
order and cohesion.  
 
More promising solutions are essentially ‘impure’: none of the three principles of social 
order is to be relied upon exclusively, but none of them is to be denied some role within a 
composite and complex ‘mix’ of institutional arrangements. These three partial 
components of social order stand in a precarious relation to each other, as each of the 
components depends upon the functioning of the two others. On the other hand, their 
relationship is antagonistic, as the predominance of any one of them risks to undermine 
the viability of the two others. 
 
Offe discusses the three components in turn. The state, the market and the community 
represent ideal-typical modes in which people live and act together, the mode of 
coordination of individuals and their action. Each of them, as it were, activates and relies 
upon one of the three collectively relevant capacities by which human beings can shape 
the social world: reason, interest and passion. 
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The state can be thought of, as the 17th century political theories in fact did, as a creature 
of human reason, both in terms of its coming into being through a rational contract and in 
view of its day-to-day ‘formal rational’ operation through bureaucratic rule (Weber). 
Reason is the capacity of individuals to find out and recognize that what is good for the 
individual and what is good for all, in principle and in the end fall together. 
 
The market is of course, driven by the interest of human agents in the purposive 
acquisition of individual goods without any or much of a consideration of, or control 
over, what the pursuit of acquisitive purposes will do to others or to our future selves, be 
it in the positive sense (as the wealth of nations being promoted through an ‘invisible 
hand’) or in the negative sense (with crises, injustices, social conflict, or environmental 
damages as an aggregate outcome that, as market logic implies, nobody can foresee and 
nobody is accountable for). 
 
Finally, there is the notion that social order presupposes or, at any rate, benefits from, the 
rights and duties that are attached to the members of the concrete communities of 
persons. The cement that integrates the members of such communities is human passion 
(such as love, honor, pride, or a sense of loyalty and attachment). From these 
communities, be they families, religious groups, or those defined by shared ethnic 
traditions or certain values and ideals, we derive our identity, our sense of belonging and 
the commitment to an ethical model that informs our life plans. 
 
The three classically distinguished modes of coordination of human action that Offe 
(2000) describes, in fact closely reflect the triplet of the French Revolution: liberty 
(market, interests), equality (state, reason) and brotherhood (community, passion). Each 
of these three types of human capacities, generating corresponding patterns of social 
order, specializes in maximizing one distinctive value. This value is equality of legal 
status, comprising duties and rights in the case of states; freedom of choice in the case of 
markets; and identity and its preservation (through commitment, solidarity and loyalty) in 
the case of communities. While justice is an important consideration within all three of 
these patterns of social order, the operational meaning of justice differs significantly. In 
the case of the modern state, the mark of justice is the extent to which the rights, most 
often equal rights of all citizens under a constitution and the rule of law principle, is 
guaranteed and enforced by state agencies. Market justice, in contrast, emphasizes the 
entitlement of partners in market transactions to obtain what was agreed upon between 
them in contracts they voluntarily entered into. Finally, justice within community is a 
standard defined according to the criteria of recognized need. The members of 
communities are called upon, in the name of some community specific justice, to come to 
the assistance of needy members even if they have in no way ‘earned’ the claim to such 
assistance through contributions made by them or through legal entitlements assigned to 
them by state authorities. The group is deciding, according to its standards, values and 
traditions, who is in legitimate need of what. 
 
This brief exercise in sociological basics is needed to understand the truth of two related 
propositions. First, providing for social order and stability through institutions cannot rely 
on one of these patterns – state, market, community – alone. Any ‘monistic’ institutional 
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design tends to ignore (on the theoretical plane) and destroy (in its practical implications) 
the contributions that the other two components of the social order have to make. Second, 
it cannot even rely on a combination of any two (that is, excluding the respective third) of 
these patterns, be it a market-state, state-community, or community-market synthesis. All 
three foundations of social order are needed, and in a mix that prevents them from 
undercutting each other.  
 
The problem of designing appropriate institutions can thus be formulated as that of 
keeping an appropriate distance from the extremes of ‘pure’ solutions while at the same 
time avoiding ‘too little’ use of any one of them. This demarcating of the components of 
social order, of correcting, maintaining and fine-tuning the mix within the bounds of a 
complete balance is what a ‘civil society’ is about, according to Offe (2000). It is 
important to briefly remark here that the term ‘civil society’ is used in different ways and 
often is made to refer to the mode coordination of human action that Offe (and others) 
calls ‘community’. The reason for this is that civil society in that sense is the interaction 
of ‘civilians’, as contrasted with ‘citizens’ and ‘consumers/producers’.  
 
 
2.3. A mixed architecture of governance 
 
The pure doctrines are easily recognized. First, social democratic statism (although that is 
the doctrine least often advocated as a ‘pure’ public philosophy these days) emphasizes 
the activist use of strong governing capacities as the key to social order and social justice. 
It is opposed by market liberalism, or rather libertarianism, as a doctrine that proposes to 
rely on social coordination to be effected through price signals and little else, thus 
advocating privatization, deregulation and the demolition of status rights, particularly the 
status rights of labor. Finally, there are religious as well as non-religious communitarian 
and in essence social conservative public philosophies, which emphasize the shared 
meaning, mission and identity of family, religious and national communities as the 
ultimate foundations of social cohesion. Needless to say, systems of political parties in 
many countries reflect this configuration of public philosophies, divided as they are into 
socialist/social democratic parties, market liberal parties and parties envisaging social 
order in terms of religious, ethnic or other value-driven identities. 
 
According to Offe, the problem of designing and defending state-society relations is not 
that of opting simplemindedly for one of the three, but of engaging in, or at the very least, 
tolerating a process of the ongoing design, readjustment and fine-tuning of a rich and 
adequate mix in which all three building blocks of social order have a mutually limiting 
and variable role. The capacity to invent, implement and tolerate such ideologically and 
quintessentially impure patchworks of social order is the mark of civility or ‘civilness’, 
i.e. the ability and willingness of citizens to utilize open and peaceful deliberation as well 
as the institutional methods of carrying out social and political conflict.  
 
If institution building according to some ‘correct line’ can no longer be performed by 
political ideologues and politicians, then what can guide it instead? Offe puts that in an 
age that has outgrown the scheme of ideologists; the key role in designing and preserving 
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social order must reside with the citizens and their civic associations themselves. In an 
essentially mixed institutional world, informed public judgment and deliberative civic 
engagement is needed instead of ideological ‘expert’ knowledge. Offe points out that it 
appears that today both socialist and conservatives have come to recognize and heed the 
need for self-limitation, giving room to the market and to each others principles; yet most 
market liberals are lagging behind in the reflexive art of relativizing their own creed. The 
‘belief’ in the solving powers of the market is still strong.  
 
The conclusion Offe draws is that there is no given, pre-known optimal design of society. 
It is a collective balancing act between different mechanisms and their accompanying 
values and dynamics, and this balancing act has to be continuously done, by well-
informed democratic deliberation within and between collective actors, both formal and 
informal. To be sure, demonstrating by academic methods inconsistencies and 
infeasibilities will help to make more enlightened choices. But the answer remains 
ultimately a matter of ‘voice’, not of ‘proof’, or of some objective measure of rationality. 
This is why the design of society is a matter politics, and almost any answer to the 
question of the proper role and desirable relative size of macro-social organization 
principles of society will be controversial and essentially contested. 
 
When pursuing the idea of an ongoing ‘civic mix’ of the various ingredients of social 
order, Offe arrives at a list of six pathological approaches to the building of social and 
political institutions, or six fallacies. Three of them result from the single-minded reliance 
upon any one of the three building blocks, and the other three from the premise that any 
one of the three can entirely be left out of the architecture of social order. These various 
fallacies differ as to the seriousness of their impact and frequency with which they occur 
at present.  
 
a) The fallacy of excessive statism 
 
It might seem that after the breakdown of the type of state socialism that reigned in the 
Soviet empire, as well as after the collapse of much of the intellectual hegemony of 
Keynesianism in the 1980s, the orthodoxy of excessive statism has become very unlikely 
at present. However, there is a difference between a big state (as measured in terms of the 
size of the budget or the number of state employees) and a strong state, a state whose 
governance has a significant impact upon the level and distribution of life chances within 
society. It may well happen that a state is oversized and under-effective at the same time, 
and that the goods it generates are in fact not public goods, but ‘club’ goods enjoyed by 
privileged categories in society (civil and/or military elites). 
 
There is an ongoing debate within advanced societies as to which spheres of life and 
collective provision should be adopted or maintained by state authorities and which 
should be left to, or transferred to, markets of communities (Nelson, 2002). Liberal critics 
of big government must be granted the point that excessive statism often incalculates 
dispositions of dependency, inactivity, rent seeking, clientelism, authoritarianism, 
cynicism, fiscal irresponsibility, avoidance of accountability, lack of initiative and 




b) The fallacy of ‘too little’ governing capacity 
 
It is important however to not disregard the importance of the state because of these 
symptoms of too much state. The state, at the very minimum, is called upon to protect 
life, property and liberty of citizens. The majority of the citizens would not have property 
and liberty in the absence of a state-organized education system, housing policy, labor 
law and social security. In addition, markets for goods, services and financial assets 
cannot exist without the continuous generation and adjustment of the norms of civil law, 
as well as the state organized and guaranteed enforcement of these norms through the 
court system within the constraints of the rule of law, to say nothing even about ‘targeted’ 
economic policies aimed at stimulating certain desirable economic developments. If 
anything, Offe puts rightly, we seem to be threatened more by the pathology of severe 
state deficiencies than by the pathology of state hypertrophy, although market liberals 
routinely emphasize the latter. Or, perhaps more accurately, we suffer from the combined 
malaise of the oversized and underperforming state. 
 
 
c) The fallacy of excessive reliance on the market mechanism  
 
Markets are mechanisms for the competitive allocation of both the factors and results of 
production, mediated through price signals. Markets respond to individual desires, as 
expressed through effective demand. But Offe points out that, except at the very lowest 
level of income categories, life satisfaction and self-reported happiness are but very 
weakly correlated with increases in market income and the subsequent effective demand 
such income allows to be made for goods and services. This is partly due to the –entirely 
market induced and negative – ‘need’ to avoid a relative loss of income. Non-tradable 
pleasures play an important role for overall life satisfaction, and the market can by 
definition not provide these. Preferences for a just society, for example cannot be fulfilled 
by the market. The market is said to reward and therefore improve efficiency. But 
efficiency is valued mainly in an environment where efficiency laggards are punished, 
i.e. within markets. The markets sometimes has been compared to a ‘prison’, in which we 
are coerced to perform activities that are not at all necessarily related to our needs, 
diverging our time and energy away from them. Markets place a premium upon efficient 
outcomes that are measured by markets as superior in terms of efficiency: a circular 
logic. Offe even suggests that from this viewpoint, arguing that market arrangements are 
preferable over other arrangements because they yield greater efficiency is similar to 
arguing that cherry trees are preferable over all other trees because they bear cherries. He 
lists several other compelling reasons for distrusting the general notions about the 
positive characteristics of markets. Markets are ‘self-destructive’ in the sense that when 
left alone cartels and monopolies are formed corrupting the very market that produced 
them. Markets are known to be deaf and blind: deaf as to the negative externalities they 
cause, blind to the long term consequences of market transactions for those involved in 
them. Markets not only lack a self-reproductive mechanism (they constantly tend to 
subvert themselves into market defeating monopolistic arrangements), they also lack a 
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self-restraining mechanism. Because they have no way of distinguishing between 
‘marketable’ and ‘non-marketable’ items, they tend to flood the spheres of social life and 
marketize everything – unless the distinction is imposed upon them from the outside, 
through a legal ban (like on drugs) or through standards of proper behavior established by 
communities. The advocates of markets tend to shy away from appreciating the 
legitimacy of a second-order competition between the market and other methods of 
generating and distributing valued items. To illustrate this, it can be said that in the 
European middle ages, the scope of the marketable items was much wider than it is now 
in the modern market economies. This may seem strange but it starts making sense when 
we remember that among the goods traded in the Middle Ages were items such as the 
salvation of one’s soul, military force, the right to marry and other goods that we have 
come to consider as ‘non-tradable’. It could be argued that the diminishing market share 
of the market was a sign of what we like to think of as progress.  
 
At best it seems, the market’s contribution to the creation of social order is strictly 
contingent upon its being firmly embedded in constraints, restrictions, regulations, 
limitations, status rights and informal social norms; imposed upon it from the outside, by 
either the state or the community.  
 
 
d) The fallacy of an excessive limitation of market forces.  
 
But is it necessary to not forget what markets are good for. Offe mentions four points. 
First, market exchange, if properly supervised and embedded, is usually peaceful and 
non-violent. In the 18th century political economists pleaded for the market praising the 
virus of doux commerce, as contrasted with the violence of feudal lords, rivaling city-
states and individual robbers trying to gain riches in more aggressive ways. People who 
relate to each other as actual or potential partners in market exchange normally have little 
reason to go at each other’s throats. On the contrary, they may even develop a certain 
sympathy for each other, because with the market transaction comes social interaction. 
Market outcomes (like earned income per hour or prices from products and services) 
cannot be attributed to any concrete actor. They stimulate self-responsibility and 
adaptation. Markets are learning environments that favor self-attribution of both 
favorable and unfavorable outcomes, and as a result, a cognitive frame of responsibility. 
Markets favor learning and stimulate the creativity and energy of individual actors. 
Finally, the market has a liberating potential, because it allows the holder of marketable 
assets to escape the control of either communities or state bureaucracies. Markets are 
essential building blocks of the institutional structure of social life and cannot be missed. 
 
 
e) The fallacy of excessive communitarianism 
 
There presently is a tendency of disenchantment with the premises of liberal 
individualism and its socialist concomitant of universalism. In order to become yourself, 
you must discover, recognize and cultivate the distinctive ‘roots’ that tie you to your 
family and beyond that to ethnic, linguistic, religious communities and their life forms. 
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‘Identity politics’ has become a widely copied strategy of self-declared groups to gain 
access to privileges. Similarly, in post-communist countries there is a dramatic rise of the 
politics of ethnic, religious and linguistic identity politics and nationalism and violent 
separatism. The communitarian politics of identity and difference tend to be exclusive, 
anti-egalitarian, and notoriously difficult to reconcile with civic principles of neutrality 
and ‘color-blind’ toleration. Identity is the passionate identification with some 
community and is almost by definition inalienable and non-negotiable. It is by essence 
not egalitarian because it emphasizes differences and it is by nature not free because it is 
based on the ties that bind us. 
 
 
f) The fallacy of neglecting communities and identities 
 
However, communities and identities that we are born in are the most potent generators 
of moral commitment and ethical capacity. Communities provide individuals with a sense 
of meaning and mission, as well as with all the feelings of pride, trust, love, guilt, honor, 
commitment end so on, that can only be acquired in communities. Only communities can 
generate ‘strong’ individuals who are prepared to be held accountable for their acts and 
thoughts, as opposed to spineless opportunists (that too much market would stimulate) or 
passive consumer-citizens (that too much state would generate). Communities cannot be 
manufactured or artificially reproduced, and like the different species in nature they need 
to be protected from extinction due to the ruthless market or political forces of 
modernization. Communities are the source of moral energies, which have driven 
economic, political and social innovation. This is also true for the less ascriptive but still 
relatively permanent identities that are based upon people’s belonging to local 
communities, professional categories, political, social or environmental movements. 
Communities are indispensable and should be given space for their activities because 
they create a value that nowhere else can be provided, the value of having values. 
 
The three forces, or options for institution building tend to undercut each other. They also 
depend on each other. As none of them is dispensable, there is a need for self-limitation 
of the proponents of each of them. Emerging institutional forms of public regarding 
agency do in fact emphasize, if only in negative ways, necessary limitations. For instance 
‘non-governmental organizations’, the ‘non-profit sector’. With equally good reasons one 
could speak about non-sectarian’, i.e. non-exclusive or non-discriminatory kinds of 
institutions.  
 
It must be remembered that state, market and community are analytical categories, which 
have been discussed in a rather schematical fashion. In reality, pure forms of these cannot 
be found (a firm is also a community, there is also a ‘market’ for policy, etcetera) – they 
are useful idealtypical devices. The following section will focus on transnational NGOs, 











In the former section, the framework of exit-voice-loyalty was presented, and the three 
main spheres of governance were discussed – state, market and community – and their 
interdependence and interaction. It is clear that a discussion on global governance will 
also involve those spheres of governance. But global governance has several unique 
features, distinguishing it from other systems of governance: its scale (geographical, 
organizational), diversity (of languages, cultures, histories, political structures, 
economies), and borders (there are none in global governance, because by definition it 
should encompass the whole globe).  
 
In this last section of our contribution to the Globelics conference , we finally address the 
question of global governance. Globalists, anti-globalists, globophobes, globophiles, neo-
liberals, fundamentalists, politicians, businessmen – all have different views, interests, 
ideals from which they develop their ideas on and approaches to global governance. How 
can we meaningfully think about global governance? We will not attempt to be 
exhaustive here, but rather select an actor with growing importance at the global scene: 
transnational NGOs. Doing so, we hope we provide some clues as to a possible 
appropriate framework for the Globelics network. 
 
The ‘demand’ for a structure of global governance is clear. As pointed out in section 1, 
there are many problems that are of global scale and require some sort of global 
governance. In numerous books, reports and other publications on globalization and anti-
globalization it is stated that the process of globalization is putting pressure on existing 
more-or-less stable institutional structures. The balanced mix of state, market and 
community has evolved in the course of a long period of time, within the framework of 
the nation-state. In spite of the growing presence of many international actors, there is no 
comparable balance of this triad at the supra-national level.  
 
The ‘supply’ of global governance structures shows a crowded, dynamic landscape of  
pluriform organizations with a wide range of different missions, ambitions, aims, ideas, 
ideals, functions, roles, background, history. Historically, global governance has occurred 
without global institutions. The nineteenth century was a time of deepening integration 
and unprecedented expansion of trade, investment flows, and migration of people. Some 
world-wide governance was partly provided by the exercise of dominion through 
empires, especially Britain’s. It was politically stable, but it lacked consent and was 
ultimately unsustainable. It also depended heavily on self-regulated markets that were 
prone to crisis, drawing states into more active management of their economies. This in 
turn contributed to economic nationalism and indirectly to the major twentieth-century 
conflicts, which to some extent halted the process of globalization, but also stimulated it; 
the world wars were global wars, and the awareness of the interdependency of processes 
across the world and the vulnerability of international relations, ‘globalized’ many minds. 
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The current process of globalization has spread out to many different areas, and is not 
comparable to the globalization of the 19th century. The challenges the world is facing 
today are of a different size and scale. Global warming, global migration, global 
terrorism, global markets, these issues cannot be dealt with properly without a structure 
of global governance.  
 
Unilateral or bilateral relations will not do, and even institutionalized multi-lateral 
relations will not be sufficient. These will reflect the existing power relations, and the 
most powerful states will dominate global decision-making. That is problematic, because 
the only acceptable rule is democratic rule. The reason for this is twofold, normative and 
pragmatic. Interfering with people’s lives is only legitimate with their consent, be it 
directly, or indirectly by their consent on general rules in society; and this consent can 
only be ensured via a democratic system. In addition: even without taking into account 
ideals like social justice (ideals that may not be shared all over the world), democracy 
seems to have the best record as a governance structure favoring peace and economic 
development. The nations generally considered most successful all have (a form of) 
democratic rule. 
 
3.1. Upscaling the triad 
 
Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are thought to fulfill several important roles at 
the supranational level that are not and maybe even cannot be fulfilled by any other type 
of organization. As set out in section 2, market, state and community are the three basic 
spheres of coordination of human interaction, and they compete and cooperate with each 
other, counterbalancing and complementing the others, forming a dynamic triad of 
checks and balances that got fine-tuned in history. With the ‘upscaling’ of the market as 
the result of the process of globalization, the state and community also had to be upscaled 
in order to keep the market in check. This however was not so easy; whereas the market 
can be upscaled relatively simple because of the universal, anonymous characteristics of 
money facilitating exchange between very different actors, the state and the community 
have different characteristics. 
 
The state is by definition bound to a geographical space, and it took many centuries 
before the state had the position in society that it has now. The upscaling of the sphere of 
the state to the international level is a long process with many hurdles but with progress. 
It is reflected in supranational governmental structures such as the United Nations (UN), 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) the European Union (EU), the African Union 
(AU), the “Asian union” (the so-called ten-plus-three, ASEAN plus China, Japan and 
South Korea), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the World Bank and the 
IMF, and many more. However, a global government with global laws, global 
enforcement and global democracy is still very far away, and it is questionable whether it 
ever will come into being. A very important success-factor for nation states was the 
presence of external threats from other countries; a global state though will not have 




The upscaling of the sphere of community is problematic too. A community usually is 
exclusive, defining its identity as much by what it is not as by what it is, and building on 
(a minimal amount of) shared characteristics of the members.  A community needs roots; 
it needs shared experiences, a shared history, a shared language, shared ideals – the glue 
that keeps people together. But in spite of English being on the way of becoming a world-
language, and of the new media connecting people regardless of distance, showing the 
world to the world, there are not much commonalities that all actors in the world share, 
around which a meaningful community can be build. Even supposedly universal values 
as embodied in the Human Rights, are not shared everywhere. In many countries, it is 
quite normal to make a difference in rights of people, for example on the basis of gender, 
of age, of class. Although some observers are relatively optimistic about upscaling 
community, as for example is reflected in Toffler’s notion of a ‘global village’ and 
reports with titles like Our Global Neighbourhood, and even though there is a growing 
group of mobile ‘cosmopolitans’ that live and work anywhere in the world together with 
people of very different backgrounds – in fact the people in this group do share many 
important characteristics (education level, type of profession, family background) and are 
more similar than they may realize. 
 
Because simply upscaling of the building blocks of global governance will not work, the 
simple analytical framework of three spheres needs to be supplemented. NGOs have a 
special position that may be key to get a better understanding of global governance. 
 
 
3.2. NGOs: between state, market and community 
 
One of the most interesting actors on the stage of global governance is the NGO, the non-
governmental organization. The definition of NGO is not commonly agreed upon.  They 
are self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared toward improving 
the quality of life (Vakil 1997). With this definition, there still is a whole range of types 
of organizations that fit in. However, NGOs are different from for example GROs 
(grassroots organizations) or VOs (voluntary organizations), or PSCs (public service 
contractors).10 The term ‘NGO’ is generally used for organizations with a clear formal 
organization structure and administration. Though often working with volunteers NGOs 
have a core of people working as paid employees, and though NGOs often provide public 
services they do this self-assigned, not as a contractor. The term NGO is understood here 
to refer to those organizations that are officially established, run by employed staff (often 
urban professionals or expatriates), well-supported (by domestic or, as is more often the 
case, by international funding), and that are often relatively large and well-resourced 
(Mercer 2000). In this paragraph we will discuss the role of international and 
transnational NGOs in global governance, by using the triad of state, market and 
community. 
 
3.2.1. NGOs and state 
 
                                                 
10 Some other abbreviations often used in this context are INGOs (international NGOs), IGOs (international 
governing organizations) and TNCs (transnational corporations). 
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NGOs are non-governmental – they even owe their name to it. This is telling: NGOs have 
a so-called ‘negative identity’; they are defined by what they are not.11 That is only useful 
if they in fact share a lot of the characteristics of the thing they are not: it is like defining 
a horse as being a zebra but without stripes, or a laptop as a non-stationary computer. 
NGOs share many important characteristics with governments; they are non-profit, and 
they are working for a (the) ‘public good’. The relationships between NGOs and 
governments are close. An important part of NGO-work consists of influencing 
governments, lobbying, putting issues on the agenda. NGOs need governments to get 
things done, to change policy and legal frameworks, and also simply for the funding of 
their activities: governments are large donors to NGOs, especially in the area of 
developmental aid. NGOs do not only work closely with governments, they also share 
characteristics of governmental organizations in terms of organization structure. With 
increasing size, NGOs tend to develop bureaucratic structures resembling those of 
governments, devised to bring transparency, efficiency, responsibility and accountability 
into the growing organization (though sometimes achieving the opposite).  
  
Governments in some cases view NGOs as problem-factors, standing in the way of their 
policy – for example when members of Green peace chain themselves to trees that were 
planned to be cut, or to a train that was supposed to transport nuclear waste. NGOs can 
considerably damage governments, making mistakes or failures, or fiercely criticizing 
their values, ideas and policy.  
 
Often though, governments see NGOs as valuable partners. Governments need as much 
relevant information for their policy-making as possible, making use of different sources. 
NGOs are seen as an important source of information – either directly in what is 
happening (pollution, abuse, neglect) or indirectly, in signaling what is living among the 
people (feelings about justice, emotions about values, support for certain policies). In that 
sense, NGOs are channels of important information, and governments both at the national 
and international level view involving NGOs as a way of increasing the democratic level 
of their activities: consulting representatives of different interest groups in society 
(including NGOs) makes the basis of governmental policies more democratic, and the 
policies themselves usually more successful.12 
 
The growth of the number and influence of NGOs can be understood as a reaction to a 
growing democratic deficit at the supra-national level, resulting from the dispersed nature 
of decision-making across national borders (Jordan and Van Tuijl 2000). 
 
In addition to increased democratic legitimacy, when governments work with NGOs and 
help them realize their ideals, they gain increased moral legitimacy. By serving a ‘good 
cause’, governments are signaling that they morally OK, that their motives are pure – 
even if their actions may seem not to be so (and may actually also really not be so; the 
road between pure motives and concrete actions is long and dirty). They show that they 
                                                 
11 The advantage of this is that it doesn’t close of the category, to certain types of activities, certain types of 
objectives and goals. 
12 That is, if the danger of a mediocre compromise (which can be more detrimental than any of the more 
‘radical’ alternatives) can be avoided. 
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mind, that they are responsive to signals from society, that they are willing to take care of 
the weak, the needy, the innocent, the ones without a voice; and that the people can sleep 
well at night, trusting the government with the public good. This moral-psychological 
effect is not to be underestimated; the United Nations for example consciously and 
explicitly involve representatives of civil society (usually NGOs) to increase their 
legitimacy and authority. The United Nations need to ‘preach what they practice’, in 
order to gain public support and ‘moral’ power, to counterbalance the political power of 
individual member-states, or at least influence the decisions on the national level in the 
direction of supporting UN policy. 
 
NGOs are complementing governments, by helping them providing information and 
additional legitimacy; and they are disciplining governments, keeping them in shape by 
criticizing them, pointing out gaps in or side-effects of their policy, helping them to keep 
themselves in (moral) check. NGOs are close to governments, sometimes too close.  
But there are good reasons why they are explicitly called ‘non-governmental’: unlike 
governments, they do not have the instrument of law, nor do they have a mandate of law-
enforcement (including the monopoly to legitimate use of violence for this); people in 
NGOs are not elected by an electorate, they are not kept in check by a parliament, they 
are not representing a clear identifiable group of people. If contributors do not agree with 
what they do, they can simply stop their contribution, and maybe switch to another NGO. 
NGOs do not have a ‘monopoly’ position to their beneficiaries, like states have for their 
citizens. 
  
Governments deliver ‘public goods’ (physical, social and legal infrastructures) and to 
enable them to do so, citizens have to pay taxes. NGOs do not have the right to raise 
taxes to finance their activities, they depend on contributors, members, donors. To get 
financial support, NGOs have to be very explicit about what they do and why it is 
important. Some governments stress the (partial) ‘deal’-character of providing public 
goods and services for tax-money more than others; for example in the US it is quite 
common to find signs saying something like “The State of California is building a road 
here for you”, thereby relinking citizens and government in a common pool of interest.  
Especially in the US, certain services thought to be ‘public’ in nature are done by private 
parties; meaning: not as paid contractors, but as sponsors. “Company X has adopted this 
road (wood, school, neighborhood, asylum), and will take care of it for you”. Companies 
do this of course for public relations, but they also do this because they think it is 
important to have good roads (schools, woods, etc.) because everyone will be better off 
because of it, and next to that they do it because they feel they have a social role: that 
they partly owe their success to the community and want to do something in return. The 
market-motive, the public good (state) motive and the community-motive are blended 
together, ideally strengthening each other’s goals. 
NGOs and market 
 
 
3.2.2. NGOs and the market 
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NGOs are not part of the state, neither are they part of the market. NGOs are working on 
a non-profit basis. Properly speaking it should not be NGOs, but NPNGOs (non-profit 
non-governmental organizations), but the predicate ‘non-profit’ is often omitted. 
Although firms and companies are non-governmental too, and therefore in theory could 
be labeled as such, in practice it never happens. NGOs are automatically seen as not-for-
profit. How justified is this?  
 
Obviously NGOs are not in this world primarily to make profit. However, an NGO that 
manages to get a lot of funding, can decide to invests this funding in its own organization 
and to raise the salaries of employees in order to get and keep good people; investments 
that are meant to increase the effectiveness of the NGO and will lead to even more 
funding in the future. The difference with companies investing in their own assets in 
order to enlarge their performance and market share is not so big.  
 
It is not uncommon that NGOs outsource certain activities to market parties because they 
can do the job better or because they have the capacity to do it. A hybrid category is 
formed by professional fund-raisers, which sell a ‘good cause’ to people including a 
percentage profit. The money people give indeed ends up with the dying 
seals/dolphins/birds/children/fugitives, but for the entrepreneur it is in essence a business 
to earn a living.13  
 
Clearly, NGOs share characteristics with market organizations. Like companies, they 
have to ‘sell’ their products and services. Their methods for doing this resemble market 
methods. For the general audience most well-known are the TV-spots, featuring dying 
animals, tortured political dissidents, starving children, and next showing what a 
particular NGO is doing against it. In essence these are not much different from 
commercials about washing detergents, first presenting dirty cloths, stained with 
chocolate, tomato or worse, and then showing how well the detergent cleans them. 
Similarly to companies, NGOs also have taken the path of ‘branding’. If Nike or Coca 
Cola can get people to pay just because they “Can’t beat the feeling”14, then why not 
NGOs. And when looking at the catalogues Green peace is sending around these days 
(out of which you can buy cloths, towels, scarves, boots etc. from the Green peace label), 
it is hard to distinguish them from normal catalogues. Even their strategy of stressing the 
qualities of their products in terms of ‘natural’, durable’, and other environmentally 
friendly adjectives, is not unique, nor is their use of models that are not incredibly 
beautiful, thin and young, but authentic and real: many companies do these kind of things 
too these days, because it sells well.15  
 
                                                 
13 Most extreme are of course television-preachers collecting money for the good works of the church, 
becoming millionaires in the process, or sect-leaders such as in the case of Baghwan with his numerous 
Mercedeses. Their organizations clearly do not fall under the definition of NPNGOs, they sell salvation and 
are simply running a business – with elements of swindling (misguiding product-information, non-delivery 
of service) 
14 A classic advertisement logo of Coca Cola. 
15 The Body-shop in this respect is an interesting hybrid somewhere between a business and an NGO, 
advocating animal-friendliness and sponsoring good causes. 
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The development of “partnerships” between (transnational) NGOs and (transnational) 
corporations (TNCs) has arisen, oddly enough, from a growing awareness of the 
damaging impact that TNCs can have on environment, development, and social justice. 
Why would NGOs want to team up with ‘the bad guys’? NGOs increasingly have started 
to encourage corporate responsibility, as a direct, effective way to achieve their goals, 
especially seen their scarce capacity and resources; and in turn, TNCs are increasingly 
aware that they can no longer continue to simply pursue profit without taking into 
account the consequences of what they do. Television, Internet, NGO-action, more aware 
and better-educated customers – all together have lead to a big change playing field. Why 
not gain a competitive advantage with being ‘fair’, ‘green’, ‘caring’, etc. Partnerships 
between NGOs and corporations are seen as a win-win situation. However, how sincere 
are the motives of corporations, and how sincere can they be, and is sincerity and 
goodness on their part necessary to get good results? 
 
The advantages of an ethical image are well-known and PR companies openly advise 
companies who face criticism to adopt “cause-related marketing” strategies (think of the 
oil company Shell), to counterbalance bad publicity and to create trust, both with 
consumers and with governmental organizations. Corporations increasingly are aware 
that the benefits of cause-related marketing are long-term, building a surplus account of 
good-will and trust for times of crisis, and for preventing times of crisis (Thompson 
1999). 
 
TNCs often are driven by very specific objectives, that run counter to the objectives of 
non-profit NGOs (Rundall 2000). TNCs engage with NGOs to create the image that they 
are responsible “corporate citizens” who can be trusted to regulate themselves. By 
encouraging NGOs to spend time on weak voluntary codes of practice, little time is left to 
work on international codes, and strong legislation and monitoring. Because NGOs are 
influential and have exclusive relationships with governmental organizations that 
corporations never could have, influencing NGOs for corporations is a way to influence 
(international) public policy nevertheless. TNCs like to link to prestigious bodies such as 
NGOs because “the wolf needs a sheepskin”. Furthermore, they can create dependency 
(in terms of funding and organizations of joint undertakings) and by cooperating they can 
gather intelligence about NGOs, what they know, what they do, what they may do.  
 
A well-known example is the case of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (WHO 1981). 
In order to sell more substitutes for breastmilk, several TNCs were aggressively 
marketing these substitutes, using health claims, gifts to doctors and NGOs. However, 
safe some exceptions breastfeeding is the optimal way to feed infants everywhere, and it 
was estimated by the World Health Organizations that as many as one-and-a-half million 
infants die each year because they are not breastfed. There now is an International Code 
of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, but it is hard to monitor and enforce. Companies 
know that if every baby in the world were to be fed artificially for just 6 months, their 
market could expand to $36 billion (presently $7 billion). The companies first protested 
fiercely against the Code, but then seemed to have embraced it, even claiming that they 
instigated it, have always supported it and abided by it, and that their voluntary codes are 
the same thing (Rundall 2000). By supporting it they maintain a favorable business-
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climate and a good image, and reduce chances of stricter regulation. As far back as 1982, 
Raphael Pagan, a former public relations consultant to the baby food industry, 
recommended: “allying ourselves to some affirmative popular aspirations in the world so 
as to be visibly contributing not only to the world’s wealth, but to its finding a freer and 
more open read toward meeting its heart-felt needs that the road offered by the statists or 
by the ‘no growth small-is-better-redistributionists”, parallel to reaching out to hold and 
ongoing dialogue with many new publics whose understanding we need to remain in 
business (Pagan 1982, see Rundall 2000). 
 
Sponsorship is another important marketing tool for companies. Sponsorship is a 
commercial strategy for which NGOs have become key targets; the Red Cross, OXFAM, 
Save the Children and of course WHO and UNICEF have been offered partnership or 
sponsorship. Sponsorship is much more than simply a way to promote the name of a 
company. Sponsorship of research for example can influence the way scientists behave, 
the research questions and outcomes, and issues raised in meetings where laws, policies 
and international rules are discussed. The mechanism of influence is subtle. Researchers 
that get support for their work may nevertheless come up with results that cause problems 
for the sponsor, but they will put the results in a way that does less damage than it could 
have done. It takes a lot to bite the hand that feeds you. (Shaw 1993). 
 
 
3.2.3. NGOs and community 
 
NGOs originate from ‘civil society’, the organized part in the sphere of the community. 
Though they are in principle driven by a community-type of motive, they are quite far 
removed from the local bowling club. ‘Civil society’ in fact is a container-term, in which 
everything non-profit and non-governmental is put, as in a residual category. The 
diversity of organizations and initiatives that fall under civil society is immense. For 
example, civil society encompasses both anti-abortion groups and groups that are helping 
women to get a safe abortion so they can get a life; it holds rifle associations advocating 
the right to wear a gun as well as peace organizations, pleading for the end of violence. 
Save some general shared characteristics, civil society organizations are mainly 
characterized by diversity. 
 
An NGO is in principle based on the principle of solidarity in order to have any right of 
interfering with their beneficiaries – a authentic motive for action based on identifying 
with the target group (be it political fugitives from Iran, oil-covered birds in the Atlantic 
Ocean, or abused women in Bangladesh) is the only acceptable moral basis for the right 
to interfere without explicit consent of those involved. The solidarity-motive is what 
makes NGOs part of civil society. The difference with pure forms of civil society is that 
NGOs are not a community of people organizing themselves around a matter concerning 
themselves (be it bowling, rifle shooting, improving the neighborhood); it is a group of 
people organizing themselves for the sake of ‘others’, that are not them, and could not 
have been them. In that sense NGOs are built on empathy and sympathy and altruism.  
 
 44
In economic theory there is interesting research on the (for economics puzzling) 
phenomenon of altruism. Economists are trying to put altruism in the utility-function of 
people, by referring to either the direct utility of feeling good about one’s moral state, or 
to some general implicit win-win contract between people, everyone being better off if 
everyone would be good to everyone. In terms of economics, one could picture NGOs as 
producing ‘global social capital’.  
 
Sociologists explain it in terms of the basic premise of their discipline, the innate 
disposition of human beings to be social, which finds expression in increasingly complex 
socialization processes (family, school, friends) over time. The increasing complexity of 
the socialization process is related to individualism, resulting in a wider variety of 
behavioral options for actors, and a wider range of types of interaction between them. 
Increased social and geographical mobility are adding to this. In the past, social relations 
supposedly were more static: birth decided on most of the aspects of one’s life. A son of a 
farmer would never turn into a nobleman, a woman would always (want to) marry, and 
likewise.  
 
According to sociologists like Anthony Giddens, globalization is disembedding people, 
pushing and pulling them out of their context, opening up new horizons, closing down 
old habits and traditions. Identity no longer is a given, but a question. This has 
consequences for solidarity, which was in principle based on the recognition of being in 
the same (social-economic) position, and on a notion of fairness, which was socially 
monitored within the (geographically bounded) community. Increasingly this is no longer 
the case. In an economy characterized by increasing division of labor, specialization and 
exchange, the interdependencies between people are increasing; but the social-
psychological ties binding them together rather seem to be loosening.  
 
A new type of solidarity, which is much more general, abstract and universal in nature, is 
needed to ‘keep things together’. According to some, the Declaration of the Human 
Rights in the late 18th century was a revolutionary step in the development of this type of 
solidarity.  
 
In practice, the extension of social behavior and feelings of solidarity to anonymous 
persons at the other side of the globe, or to animals and even trees can be seen as a 
positive ‘externality’ of the socialization process, an extrapolation of principles from the 
direct domain (family, the dog, the garden) into the more distant areas (Africa, giant 
panda’s and the rain forest).  
 
 
3.3. NGOs and global governance 
 
The role of NGOs on the global scene is seen as important to understand the type of 
solution needed for the unique requirements of global governance: to deal with the size, 
scale and diversity of the world, and to deal with the absence of an exit-option.  
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According to Alan Fowler (2000), NGOs must consciously locate themselves between 
the triad. NGOs, being non-profit, non-community and non-governmental, are acting as 
intermediaries between the spheres of state, market and community. In this, they are a 
category of their own.  
 
Of course organizations always carry all three characteristics: different ministries 
compete with each other for budgets and ‘policy market-share’; a commercial 
organization can invest in the local community or sponsor the World Nature Fund; within 
communities people are competing for positions and influences. Every organization is in 
the end a community (however loose), a market (however weak) and a provider of public 
goods (whatever the precise motivation for it), just as every individual is a 
producer/consumer, a citizen and a civilian/group member.  
 
There is a necessity to analyze phenomena in terms of discrete categories, which 
consequently makes theorists turn to additive modes of social science. Thus, first areas of 
collective life are subdivided into separate spheres, and these domains get endowed with 
distinct features and rationales. Then, after distinguishing them from each other, they get 
‘added’ together again, in an attempt to get the whole picture. However, due to the 
analytical division, the attention remains focused on the differences and borders between 
the spheres, not on their intrinsic interdependencies and overall coherence. This is not 
necessarily problematic, and analytical categories are simply needed to enable people’s 
minds to grasp complex reality in the first place. However it can become problematic, 
when is forgotten that these analytically divided domains strongly influence and affect 
each other, and constitute and shape each other. Both specialized and ‘additive’ social 
theorists tend to ignore this, or if they don’t, to reconstruct the whole in an overly 
artificial way (Kuhn 1962, Chandhoke 200).  
 
NGOs have characteristics commonly associated with each of the ‘traditional’ three 
sectors, but cannot be fully understood or analyzed from within the framework of any of 
them. Their behavior (1) resembles the state in terms of pursuing public agenda’s, (2) is 
associated with markets in terms of surplus generation and self-financing and (3) express 
solidarity, the motive characteristic of community. 
 
It is important to draw on but also move beyond a too simple three-sector view of society, 
to a more complex understanding of an NGOs grounding, principles of operation, roles 
and embedding in society. NGOs are inevitably drawn towards an intermediary position, 
more than states, markets, or communities. It seems more sensible for them to capitalize 
fully and effectively on this fact, than to fight it. This combination is captures in the 
concept Fowler calls the ‘fourth position’ (2000). It can be argued that NGOs share this 
position with the media, another very important mechanism of voice that has tremendous 
impact, but is more volatile.  
 
To fulfill their intermediary position and their main function of ‘voice, NGOs should 
have the competence to speak different ‘languages’, not only literally but also 
figuratively: speak the language of different sectors, spheres, cultures; engage across 
diverse institutional boundaries and foster inter-organizational linkages. Human rights, 
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even if they are not considered as a priori, timeless and universal, nevertheless can 
provide the framework for a global process of voice. The reason to put this must not be 
understood as idealism or ideology but rather as an empirical fact: the framework of 
human rights has proven to be successful in engaging a wide variety of actors with 
different social, economic, cultural and religious backgrounds, into an international 





Globelics’ a new research NGO voice?  
 
This paper has turned out too long. There is no need therefore to summarize here again 
the main arguments presented in the paper.  
 
Globalization is disturbing the existing fine-tuned institutional balances in the framework 
of the nation state. A new division of labor between state, market and community is 
coming into place, and many of the present concrete developments can be understood in 
that light. We have highlighted in this paper the fact that at a global scale, there are no 
externalities – except for ideas such as storing nuclear waste on the moon – save one: the 
externalities towards the future. This implies that there is no exit from global problems, 
somewhere someone will have to deal with those: now or in the future. This lack of exit 
option means that in global governance, there is a strong need for a special system of 
voice and loyalty, if one does not want the citizen to start feeling totally cynical and 
disconnected about the global pressures and global problems he or she is confronted with. 
The NGOs play an important role in this, by being in an intermediary ‘fourth’ position 
between state, market and community, and by specializing in giving voice to the 
‘voiceless’: the poor, the hungry, the sick, the dying, the dead, that cannot raise their 
voice; and the whale, the giant panda and the rain forest, that have no real voice.  
 
Let us conclude with a couple of comments on Globelics. The concept of NGO is of 
course not really applicable to a research network such as Globelics. Research networks 
even of the global kind such as Globelics have no practical aim at directly contributing to 
particular global governance issues. The purpose is rather to counterbalance the 
dominance of national and Northern research. The latter, to some extent in line with was 
said here about the limited role of the nation state following globalization pressure, 
suffers increasingly from national and high income “cocooning”. This holds for natural 
sciences and engineering, life sciences as well as social sciences. Furthermore the 
increased awareness of the gap in research and innovation activities between the rich 
countries of the world, in particular the US, Europe and Japan, has led to renewed policy 
focus on measures aimed at “catching up” in the area of research and innovation (see the 
so-called Lisbon declaration and Barcelona target of the European Union). As justified 
these initiatives appear from the local, high income Northern perspective, they are likely 
to further exacerbate the growing gap in access to knowledge between the rich core and 
the rest of the world.  
 
In this sense, the aim of the Globelics research network resembles some of the typical 
NGO, and in particular its non-governmental (EU) sponsored or funded features: a 
‘negative identity’ as an alternative network in research focus; a strong voluntaristic-
based participation; a not-for-academic purpose; but a global ‘public good’ research 
purpose. And like other NGOs, Globelics will want to influence with its research priority 
setting national governments. It could be similarly argued that Globelics resembles in 
many ways also a community sponsored NGO. As Lundvall and Soete (2002) put it last 
year: “as economists… we believe that there is a strong need to get one’s priorities right. 
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Our involvement over the last decades in numerous national and EU policy reports, 
advice, studies, with many other scholars, might marginally have contributed to some 
improvements in policy making and the academic understanding of the process of welfare 
increase associated with innovation and knowledge accumulation more generally, and its 
national distribution. However, compared to the utility of such research in the South, our 
personal utility has been marginal… Hence, at the more personal level, we feel there is a 
strong need for scholars in the field of learning, innovation and competence building to 
start focusing on those parts of the globe where better insights might matter rather than be 
pecuniary led to focus on one’s own rich periphery.” In this sense Globelics appears just 
like any other NGOs based on a solidarity-motive, in this case research solidarity. 
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